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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Our own actions are a vital part of our life from birth. The above quotation 
demonstrates Jean Piaget’s view that young children aged 18 months and under are 
‘solipsistic’ (extremely egocentric) and only familiar with their own actions (1954, p. 
355). Yet, children also observe actions performed by others from early on. This 
dissertation aimed to investigate this side of the story: How children develop the 
ability to understand actions performed by others and how the increasing ‘familiarity’ 
with their own actions shapes this understanding. 
Imagine that you enter a busy restaurant and observe the following scene: You see 
many different people sitting at their tables. Some of them will be in the midst of 
eating, or reaching out to grasp their glass of wine. Others will raise their glass to 
toast their friends. And others again will talk to each other animatedly. For adults, it 
will be no difficulty to understand the actions these people are performing, because 
‘During the earliest stages 
the child perceives things 
like a solipsist who is 
unaware of himself as 
subject and is familiar only 
with his own actions.” 
 
(J. Piaget) 
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adults are able to use their knowledge to infer others’ goals and intentions from 
observed movements and the occurring context. Moreover, adults are able to predict 
others’ action goals and thus prepare quick and suitable responses when they interact 
with others. 
Now imagine a 1-year-old child observing the same scene. Will this child understand 
the actions in the same way as adults do, and predict the action goals as easily as 
adults do? It is very likely that there will be differences. Some actions, such as 
someone grasping a glass, will be apparent for even a small child. But the meaning of 
two people raising a toast to each other might not be instantly comprehensible for 
infants. And to follow a conversation seems inconceivable without some semantic 
skills and the basic knowledge about how conversations work. 
The development from child to adult is associated with achieving manifold 
experience. Throughout the ages, experience has been proposed as the main influence 
that shapes cognition. For example, more than 2000 years ago, Julius Caesar wrote 
‘Experience is the teacher of all things’. In the beginning of the last century, Albert 
Einstein maintained this view by saying ‘The only source of knowledge is 
experience’. Rather recently (i.e., in the last 20 years), scientific interest in how 
experience influences action perception has intensified. More precisely, experience in 
performing actions (i.e. active experience, or the ability to produce an action) and to a 
lesser extent experience in observing actions (i.e., passive, mainly visual experience). 
One reason for this interest was certainly the notion of a close link between 
perception and action, or more precisely, a common representational domain between 
planned and observed actions (Prinz, 1990, 1997; Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, 
& Prinz, 2001). This link has since been accepted in adults and infants, but research 
continues on how exactly experience, or action, shapes perception. 
The present dissertation aimed to investigate how different levels of experience 
influence the perception of other’s actions in distinctive areas. The restaurant scene 
described above illustrates that actions can be performed by one individual or jointly 
(for example, one person reaching for a glass, or two people raising their glasses to 
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toast each other, respectively), and that they can be nonverbal (as the above) or verbal 
(for example, two people having a conversation). In order to succeed in the 
performance of those nonverbal and verbal actions and interactions, different skills 
(and therefore different kinds of active experience) are necessary. Infants learn to 
perform various manual actions during their first year of life (e.g., Bourgeois, 
Khawar, Neal, & Lockman, 2005). During their second year of life, they learn to 
coordinate those individual actions with others in joint action (Brownell, 2011). 
During their third year of life, children master to verbally interact with others (Clark, 
2003). Thus, each of the actions in the different areas requires new skills that are 
learned successively during the first 3 years of life. Accordingly, the research 
included in this dissertation concerned the perception of an individually performed 
manual action, a jointly performed manual action, and a verbal interaction, by 
children with more or less experience in the respective areas and by adults, who are 
typically very experienced in these everyday actions. 
Before describing the specific research questions in detail, I will first define the 
concept of action perception. Second, the distinction between the perception and the 
performance of actions will be highlighted, which includes different theoretical 
accounts of action perception. Next, I will focus on different measures of action 
perception and how they are related, in order to facilitate the understanding of the 
following empirical findings. Empirical findings are organised according to the 
different areas mentioned above (perception of nonverbal and verbal action and 
interaction). Based on this overview, the resulting research questions will be outlined, 
followed by a summary of their results. The chapter will conclude by highlighting 
some limitations and future perspectives. 
1.1. Defining Action Perception 
In order to define action perception, I will disentangle the terms action and perception 
first. In a nutshell, human action consists of two main components: a movement and a 
goal (Prinz, 1997; Elsner, 2007; Csibra & Gergely, 2007). A more scientific phrasing 
establishes that ‘actions and reactions need to be regarded as segments of body 
movements that are individuated on the basis of goals’ (Hommel et al., 2001). Thus, 
1. Defining Action Perception 
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when using the term ‘action’, we always mean goal-directed actions. In its simplest 
form, this goal can be immediately visible and achieved in a single movement: I reach 
out to grasp an object that lies in front of me. But a goal can also be abstract (I speak 
to inform my conversation partner about my thoughts) and lie in the far future (I 
study to get good grades in order to get a good job). These examples also demonstrate 
that goals are organised hierarchically (Jeannerod, 1994), for example, from 
overarching goals to sub-goals that can be achieved by ‘elementary motor acts’ 
(Csibra, 2007). An even more precise description of the hierarchy of actions 
characterises four different levels (Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007; see also Hamilton 
& Grafton, 2008; Kilner, 2011):  
‘(1) The intention level that defines the long-term goal. (2) The goal level that 
describes short-term goals that are necessary to achieve the long-term intention. (3) 
The kinematic level that describes the shape of the hand and the movement of the arm 
in space and time. (4) The muscle level that describes the pattern of muscle activity 
required to execute the action.’ 
Importantly, language is also considered an action in the present dissertation 
(Pickering & Garrod, 2013; Glenberg, 2007). Because the above hierarchy of actions 
was presumably not intended for the case of language, it needs to be slightly adapted. 
One example for an intention of ‘producing language’ is to convey thoughts; an 
example for a goal is to express a word; on the kinematic level, the movements of the 
mouth and tongue can be described; and the muscle level is similar to that of other 
actions. 
The second part of action perception, the term perception, is generally defined as 
‘The process of becoming aware or conscious of a thing or things in general; the state 
of being aware; consciousness; † [spiritual] understanding [obs.].’ (‘perception, n.’, 
The Oxford English Dictionary, 2005). In psychological sciences, perception 
describes an immensely broad research field, which ranges for example from basic 
physiological processes, such as the incidence of light on the cornea, to the other end 
of the continuum, for example, acting on a perceived stimulus. For the present work, 
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the term perception needs to be narrowed down to an operational definition in the 
context of visually presented verbal and nonverbal actions. The general definition of 
perception already suggests that action perception is much more than a simple 
sensation of an action. ‘Action understanding’ is a term that is often used 
alternatively to action perception (including this work), and that is intuitively 
comprehensible, but it is difficult to define. Some authors try to describe action 
understanding as something like ‘grasping of the sense of the actions performed by 
others’ (Gallese, 2006), which replaces one abstract term with others. For this work I 
specify action understanding as ‘extracting the immediate or further goal’ (Csibra, 
2007), which matches the idea that goal detection forms the ‘core ability of action 
understanding’ (Gallese, 2009). Goal detection involves obtaining a mental 
representation of the goal. Regarding the previously described hierarchy, this targets 
the second level (goal level) of actions. Such a goal could be the glass in reaching 
actions, or the words in spoken language. In summary, my operational definition of 
action perception is as follows: Action perception is the observation of actions 
performed by others and the obtainment of a mental representation of this action, 
including the action goal. The first level of Kilner’s hierarchy, the intention level, will 
only play a minor role for this dissertation. 
1.2. Agent and Observer – Theoretical Accounts of Action Perception 
Actions can be regarded from two different perspectives: Agents produce their own 
actions first-hand, knowing their own goals and intentions. Observers perceive other 
people’s actions from the outside and have to infer their goals and intentions. Before 
elaborating on different ideas of action perception, I will first describe the 
characteristics of action production. An agent needs to plan an action ahead, that is, 
before a movement is initiated. This requires an internal mental representation, so 
called ‘motor programs’ (Summers & Anson, 2009; Rosenbaum & Krist, 1996) or 
‘action plans’ (Rotman, Troje, Johansson, & Flanagan, 2006; Flanagan & Johansson, 
2003; Prinz, 1997). These internal representations, in the following called action 
representations, not only include a representation of the movement but also a 
representation of the action goal (Gallese, 2009; Hommel et al., 2001). Furthermore, 
2. Agent and Observer – Theoretical Accounts of Action Perception 
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once a movement is initiated and agents are in the process of executing an action, 
forward models are implemented to predict motor states and the sensory 
consequences of that movement (Miall & Wolpert, 1996). Every performed goal-
directed action thus comprises an internal anticipation of a future goal and of future 
states. 
For an observer, action representations are only apparent via open behaviour and the 
context in which it occurs. This seems a disadvantage if someone seeks to understand 
others’ actions. And yet, most of the time, we effortlessly manage to understand what 
people around us are doing. There are a number of theoretical accounts that try to 
explain how action understanding is achieved. An important framework that 
addresses the general relationship between perception and action has been provided 
by Prinz (1990, 1997). The common coding approach assumes a common 
representational domain for action perception and production as opposed to strictly 
separate coding. The exact nature of this representational overlap is unknown, but it 
concerns high cognitive levels of coding (Prinz, 1997), and might operate in addition 
to separate coding (Prinz, 2012). A common representation provides a basis for a 
bidirectional influence between both action perception and production. In adults, it is 
well established that action perception can facilitate or interfere with action 
production, which is usually examined in shortened or prolonged reaction times in the 
execution of actions (Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001; Brass, Bekkering, 
Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000; Craighero, Bello, Fadiga, & Rizzolatti, 2002; Kilner, 
Paulignan, & Blakemore, 2003). Similarly, action production can facilitate or 
interfere with the processing of observed actions (Hamilton, Wolpert, & Frith, 2004; 
Miall et al., 2006; Wühr & Müsseler, 2001). 
One proposed way to achieve action understanding that relates to a common 
representation is provided by the simulation theory (e.g., Gallese, 2009; Jeannerod, 
2001; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Here, an observed action is simulated through 
mapping the observed action onto one’s own motor representations. This motor 
simulation is defined as an ‘internal representation of motor programs without overt 
movement’ (Cross, Hamilton, & Grafton, 2006; Jeannerod, 2001). The simulation 
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theory posits that, through motor simulation, we are not only able to represent others’ 
movements but also others’ action goals and intentions (Gallese, 2009; Rizzolatti & 
Sinigaglia, 2010), or the ‘meaning’ of others’ actions (Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 
2004). Proponents of the simulation theory thus assert that motor simulation by itself 
provides an understanding of the observed action. The neurophysiological foundation 
of simulation processes, which is also called direct matching, is thought to be a 
parietal-frontal network, consisting of mirror neurons that respond both when a 
particular action is executed or observed (the mirror neuron system, MNS; e.g. 
Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Motor simulation is initiated as soon as the observed 
action begins. Importantly, this enables the anticipation of an action goal in the 
observer (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010). Motor simulation has become an accepted 
and important aspect of action perception during the last 10 years. However, the 
particular proposition that simple motor simulation ‘directly’ provides action 
understanding has been challenged recently (Csibra, 2007; Hickok, 2013; Jacob, 
2013; Kilner, 2011; Kosonogov, 2012). 
A different simulation account that focuses on the anticipatory nature of action 
perception and provides a detailed description of how action understanding might 
work is the predictive coding framework (Kilner et al., 2007; Kilner, 2011). This 
framework posits that predictions are made on all hierarchical levels of an action 
(intentions, goals, motor commands, and kinematics). First, prior expectations about 
goals or intentions are estimated from the context in which an action occurs. The 
estimated goal is then used to generate a prediction of the ‘sensory consequences’ 
(i.e., kinematics) based on one’s own motor system. This predicted kinematics is 
compared with the actual observed kinematics and a prediction error is generated 
(i.e., the level of confidence with which a prediction is correct, Cross et al., 2012). 
Through reciprocal interactions among cortical hierarchies, the predictions on each 
level are updated until the prediction error is minimised and the most likely cause of 
an action is inferred. The simulation of actions is accomplished by an action-
observation network (AON, see Kilner, 2011), of which the MNS is part of. Goals or 
intentions, however, are predicted through a ‘semantic retrieval’ process that 
functions on a more abstract level and is not part of the AON (Kilner, 2011). 
2. Agent and Observer – Theoretical Accounts of Action Perception 
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An account that does not ascribe a crucial role of motor simulation to action 
understanding is the teleological stance (Csibra & Gergely, 1998, 2007; Gergely & 
Csibra, 2003). In this context, ‘teleological’ means ‘relating to ends or final causes‘ 
(‘teleological, adj.’, The Oxford English Dictionary, 2011) and stresses the 
importance of the goal for action understanding. The teleological stance was 
developed to specifically explain how infants can understand observed actions 
without inferring underlying mental states (e.g., intentions, beliefs) in the agent. The 
mechanism that allows infants to interpret a goal is called teleological reasoning. 
Teleological reasoning enables infants to relate relevant aspects of reality (action, 
goal state, and current situational constraints) through the principle of rational action 
(Gergely & Csibra, 2003). This inferential principle characterises that agents 
generally achieve their goals in the most efficient manner. A famous example that 
was used to demonstrate teleological reasoning in infants is one of a computer-
animated small circle jumping over an obstacle to reach a larger circle. When the 
obstacle was removed, infants were surprised when the small circle performed the 
now unnecessary and inefficient jumping action (Gergely, Nadasdy, Csibra, & Bíró, 
1995). This shows that infants expected the small circle to take the most efficient way 
to reach its goal (straight to the large circle). In general, this account has been used to 
explain findings showing that infants are able to attribute action goals where 
simulation is not possible, for example, when observing non-human agents (Gergely 
et al., 1995; Luo & Baillargeon, 2005; Bíró & Leslie, 2007) or biologically 
impossible motions (Southgate, Johnson, & Csibra, 2008). Notably, teleological 
reasoning does not require prior experience with the action, because it considers 
relevant constraints (e.g., the context) even of novel situations. Furthermore, the 
teleological stance explicitly states that attributing a goal to an observed ongoing 
action includes the anticipation of a future state and thus enables ‘action anticipation’ 
(Csibra & Gergely, 2007). Csibra (2007) recently integrated the mechanism of 
teleological reasoning into a larger framework where he included motor simulation. 
Here, action understanding entails what he called ‘motor emulation’. Motor 
emulation does not cause action understanding, but is the result of action 
understanding (achieved, for example, through teleological reasoning). According to 
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this ‘motor emulation account’, the function of this kind of motor activity is to enable 
us to be engaged in joint action. 
Yet another idea combines elements of the simulation theory and the teleological 
stance (Brass, Schmitt, Spengler, & Gergely, 2007). It posits that motor simulation 
provides action understanding in situations that are highly familiar to the observer. 
Only when motor simulation is insufficient because the observer does not possess 
matching motor representations (for example in novel or unusual situations), action 
understanding is accomplished via inferential interpretive processes, such as 
teleological reasoning. 
Proponents of all accounts concerning action understanding continue to interpret 
evidence in favour of their respective hypotheses (e.g., Csibra, 2007; Kilner, 2011; 
Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010). The present dissertation does not provide further 
insights in the underlying mechanisms of action understanding. But the introduced 
accounts differ in their relevance for this work. The teleological stance is without 
doubt an important account for infants’ action understanding. However, because this 
work addresses the influence of experience on action perception, it is less relevant 
that infants are able to infer action goals without active experience under some 
circumstances, such as when observing non-human agents (e.g., Gergely et al., 1995). 
For this work, it is more relevant that one’s own motor system is involved during 
action perception, be it as a cause of action understanding (simulation theory, e.g. 
Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010) or as a result (predictve coding framework, Kilner, 
2011; motor emulation account, Csibra, 2007). 
Taken together, the described approaches provide two characteristics of action 
perception that are significant to this work. First, action perception and action 
production are linked. This is stated explicitly in the common coding approach, and 
implied in all other approaches that assume motor simulation in response to a 
perceived action. An action can only be simulated by the motor system, if observers 
have obtained a matching representation in their own motor repertoire. And second, 
anticipatory processes are involved in action perception. It was established in the 
2. Agent and Observer – Theoretical Accounts of Action Perception 
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beginning of this section that, on the one hand, agents need to plan their actions ahead 
in order to perform them. The anticipation of movements and action goals is an 
inherent part of action production. On the other hand, observers are able to predict the 
goals of ongoing actions as well – regardless of the mechanisms that are assumed to 
play a role in action perception. The simulation theory, as well as the predictive 
coding framework and the teleological stance, explicitly include goal anticipation. 
Thus, it is generally accepted that agents and observers both make use of anticipatory 
processes during the production and the observation of actions, respectively. 
One manifestation of anticipatory processes that is particularly important for the 
present work is anticipatory gaze. When we perform actions, such as playing table 
tennis or driving a car, we show anticipatory gaze shifts, which means that our gaze 
precedes important steps (goals and sub-goals) of the task (Land & Furneaux, 1997). 
It was suggested that the control program for a particular action (i.e., before 
mentioned action representations) also contains information for the oculomotor 
system (Land & Furneaux, 1997). Importantly, not only agents show anticipatory 
gaze shifts but observers do as well. In a seminal study, Flanagan and Johansson 
(2003) recorded eye movements of participants during the execution of a block-
stacking task and during their perception of the same task. They found highly similar 
gaze patterns during the production of actions and the perception of others’ actions. 
By measuring gaze behaviour, it is thus possible to get a grasp on anticipatory 
processes in the agent as well as the observer. The development and implications of 
anticipatory gaze shifts will be discussed in the next section. 
1.3. Dissociation Between Measures of Action Perception 
Measuring an observer’s gaze behaviour is a particularly important approach for the 
investigation of infants’ action perception, because other typical measures, such as 
manual reaction times, are impossible to adopt with infants. There are two different 
approaches to use gaze behaviour that will be contrasted in this section: anticipatory 
and post-hoc measures. The implications of studies that used either approach differ to 
some extent, which is why I will explain both measures in more detail before moving 
on to empirical findings of action perception.  
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Anticipatory gaze behaviour (or gaze latency) has been utilised increasingly since it 
has been discovered that adults (Flanagan & Johansson, 2003) and 12-month-old 
infants (Falck-Ytter, Gredebäck, & von Hofsten, 2006) are able to predict the goal of 
an observed ongoing manual action. If an observer performs anticipatory gaze shifts 
towards the goal of an action, this suggests that the observer is able to encode the 
action goal (i.e. obtain a mental representation of it) while the action is still in 
progress. Besides this on-line anticipatory measure, there are ‘reactive’ measures of 
gaze behaviour for the study of action perception, which can be summarised as post-
hoc measures. They have in common that gaze behaviour is analysed after an action 
is fully presented to the observer (i.e. at least until the goal has been achieved). 
(Gredebäck & Melinder, 2010). The most common post-hoc measure is looking time. 
Infants tend to look longer at unexpected actions or action goals, which makes it 
possible to infer the expectations that infants have built during the observation. 
Looking time is used, for example, in habituation paradigms, in violation-of-
expectation paradigms, or in preferential-looking paradigms. Generally, anticipatory 
and post-hoc measures can both be used to explore infants’ expectations about an 
action goal (Falck-Ytter et al., 2006; Woodward, 1998) or of the means with which an 
action was completed (Gergely et al., 1995; Gredebäck & Melinder, 2010). In any 
case, infants are required to encode an agent’s goal (Gredebäck & Melinder, 2010), in 
order to form expectations about the goal itself or rational means to achieve it. 
However, anticipatory and post-hoc measures differ in the time and information 
available to encode an action goal. Whereas the time to encode a goal is strictly 
limited for its anticipation, more time and more information is available to do so after 
the action is completed. 
Apart from different time limits, there seems to be a functional dissociation between 
anticipatory and post-hoc measures (for studies contrasting both measures, see Daum, 
Attig, Gunawan, Prinz, & Gredebäck, 2012; Gredebäck & Melinder, 2010). Reactive 
gaze behaviour indicates that infants are able to encode the goal of an observed action 
by 6 months of age (e.g., Daum, Prinz, & Aschersleben, 2011; Woodward, 1998). 
The on-line anticipation of action goals has been reported primarily by the end of the 
first year of life (Falck-Ytter et al., 2006; Gredebäck & Melinder, 2010; Cannon, 
3. Dissociation Between Measures of Action Perception 
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Woodward, Gredebäck, von Hofsten, & Turek, 2012; but see Kanakogi & Itakura, 
2011). Many studies, typically using manual actions, indicate a close relationship 
between infants’ ability to anticipate an action goal and active experience, that is, 
their own ability to perform that action (Kanakogi & Itakura, 2011; Gredebäck & 
Kochukhova, 2010; Gredebäck & Melinder, 2010; Cannon et al., 2012). Similarly, 
post-hoc measures have also been found to correspond to infants’ own experience 
(Daum et al., 2011; Sommerville, Woodward, & Needham, 2005) though not 
consistently so (Daum, Prinz, & Aschersleben, 2009; Gredebäck & Melinder, 2010). 
Anticipatory measures thus seem to rely more unambiguously on infants’ own 
experience than post-hoc measures. The occurrence of anticipatory gaze is often 
interpreted as evidence for simulation processes in the observer (e.g. Falck-Ytter et 
al., 2006; Gredebäck & Kochukhova, 2010; Kanakogi & Itakura, 2011), which are 
thought to ‘aid in effortless, efficient prediction of ongoing movements’ (Cross, 
Stadler, Parkinson, Schütz-Bosbach, & Prinz, 2013), whereas the mechanisms that 
allow infants to infer action goals in a post-hoc paradigm are generally less clear 
(Aslin, 2007). 
A further theoretical consideration is that measuring anticipatory gaze takes into 
account anticipatory processes in the observer. Because anticipatory processes are 
important for the perception, as well as the production of actions, anticipatory 
measures of action perception warrant better comparability to action production than 
post-hoc measures. For the above described advantages, we measured anticipatory 
gaze in the current work. In the following section, I will summarise empirical 
findings of previous research, most of which used post-hoc measures. The empirical 
and theoretical observations about anticipatory and post-hoc measures have to be kept 
in mind when previous findings about children’s action perception are interpreted. 
1.4. Action Perception in Children 
As previously described, the production and the perception of an action are closely 
linked. Thus, the actions that can be used to explore an influence of experience on 
action perception are dependent on children’s own cognitive and motor skills at a 
certain age. For example, in order to investigate infants’ understanding of a reaching 
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action, one has to consider the age at which infants typically start reaching 
themselves. In the following, previous findings concerning infants’ action perception 
and experience will be summarised, organised according to the different areas: 
nonverbal actions performed by one individual, nonverbal actions performed jointly, 
and conversations, as a case of ‘verbal joint action’.  
1.4.1. Nonverbal individual action 
In a majority of studies, reaching-to-grasp actions have been utilised to investigate the 
interplay between the perception and the production of actions, a skill that emerges at 
the age of 3 to 4 months (e.g. White, Castle, & Held, 1964). For example, if 3-month-
old infants’ reaching-to-grasp skills were trained through the use of ‘sticky mittens’ 
(i.e. Velcro mittens that objects stick to), they were subsequently able to encode the 
goal of an actor’s reaching action, when tested via a visual habituation paradigm 
(Sommerville et al., 2005). Without this training, infants only mastered this task at 6 
months (Woodward, 1998). The use of sticky mittens to promote grasping behaviour 
in 3-month-olds also induced more general cognitive developments, such as increased 
visual exploration behaviour of agents and objects (Libertus & Needham, 2010), or 
increased face preference (Libertus & Needham, 2011). Furthermore, there was a 
correspondence between 6-month-old infants’ grasping skills (palmar vs. thump 
opposition) and their looking times to unexpected grasping actions (i.e. large hand 
aperture for small objects and vice versa; Daum et al., 2011; see also Loucks & 
Sommerville, 2012). And only infants with advanced fine motor skills (in this case, 
the extent to which infants grasped or manipulated objects) were able to discriminate 
between biologically possible and impossible grasping movements at 8 months of age 
(Reid, Belsky, & Johnson, 2005). Examining anticipatory gaze behaviour, it was 
found that grasping skills (measured by the reaching angle between the two hands) 
correlated with gaze latency towards the goal of human grasping actions in a group of 
4- to 10-month-old infants (Kanakogi & Itakura, 2011). 
Other manual actions have also been utilised. For example, 9-month-olds were only 
able to attribute a goal to a pointing action if they could use the pointing gesture 
themselves (Woodward & Guajardo, 2002). Using a means-end task (pulling a cloth 
4. Action Perception in Children 
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to retrieve a toy), a correlation between infants’ own ‘planful behaviour’ (e.g. fixating 
the toy and grasping it) and their ability to encode the goal of a similar observed task 
was found in 10-month-olds (Sommerville & Woodward, 2005). Also in 10-month-
olds, active training with a means-end task (using a cane to retrieve a toy) facilitated 
the ability to identify the goal of a similar tool-use event (Sommerville, Hildebrand, 
& Crane, 2008). Furthermore, the extent to which 12-month-old infants 
spontaneously produced containment actions (i.e., placing objects in a bucket) 
corresponded to their gaze latency when subsequently watching them (Cannon et al., 
2012). 
Crawling has also been used to demonstrate a relationship between infants’ motor 
skills and their cognitive abilities. It was found that already crawling infants at 7 
months looked longer at self-propelled objects than not yet crawling 7-month-olds 
(Cicchino & Rakison, 2008), which indicates a more sophisticated perception of self-
propelled objects once crawling is achieved. And finally, children’s goal anticipation 
during the observation of a puzzle being solved was dependent on their own ability to 
solve the puzzle at 25, but not yet at 18 months of age (Gredebäck & Kochukhova, 
2010). 
The above described studies have generally demonstrated that there is either a link 
between infants’ own production skills and perceived individual action, or an 
influence of action experience on perception. For many manual actions, this link 
seems to develop at some point during the first year of life. However, it remains 
unclear whether a link between production and perception is established as soon as 
the ability to produce an action emerges, or whether more experience is necessary. 
1.4.2. Nonverbal joint action 
Infants engage in face-to-face interactions with their caregivers from birth. These 
interactions are guided and shaped by adults during the first year of life. The ability to 
engage in coordinated joint action emerges only during the second year of life (for an 
overview, see Brownell, 2011). However, infants observe others’ coordinated joint 
action from very early on. How they perceive these interactions has recently become 
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a question of interest (e.g., Henderson & Woodward, 2011; Schmitow & 
Kochukhova, 2013). Using a habituation paradigm, it has been shown that 14-month-
old infants are able to infer the joint goal of two actors collaboratively retrieving a toy 
from a closed box (Henderson & Woodward, 2011). Using the same paradigm, 10-
month-olds were not yet able to infer the joint goal, not even after visual experience 
(Henderson, Wang, Matz, & Woodward, 2013). However, if 10-month-olds actively 
experienced the joint action themselves prior to the habituation task, they were able to 
infer the joint goal of the two observed agents (Henderson et al., 2013). Using gaze 
latency, it has been shown that 10- and 18-month-olds’ gaze shifts towards joint goals 
are modulated by their own experience with the respective manual actions, such as 
placing things in a bucket, building a tower, or give and take actions (Schmitow & 
Kochukhova, 2013). When presented with two agents feeding each other, infants at 
12, but not 6 months, anticipated the goal of this action (i.e., the mouth), and this was 
modulated by their own experience with being fed (Gredebäck & Melinder, 2010). 
Notably, already 6-month-olds were able to anticipate that food will be brought to the 
mouth if one agent fed herself (Kochukhova & Gredebäck, 2010). And last, 18-
month-old infants were able to anticipate a joint goal of two agents who sequentially 
placed blocks, and did so more often if the actors were socially engaged (Fawcett & 
Gredebäck, 2013). 
The above reported studies (using both anticipatory and post-hoc measures) suggest 
that infants’ ability to infer observed joint goals typically emerges around their first 
birthday, or shortly afterwards. This ability seems to depend on infants’ own 
experience with the manual action (Schmitow & Kochukhova, 2013), and their own 
experience with joint action (Henderson et al., 2013), respectively. Apart from this 
apparent analogy to the perception of individual actions, the feeding studies point 
towards a difference between the perception of individual and joint action in infants, 
because 6-month-olds were able to anticipate an individually but not a jointly 
performed feeding action. It has not yet been investigated systematically whether 
infants understand actions performed by one agent differentially from actions 
performed by two agents. 
4. Action Perception in Children 
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1.4.2. ‘Verbal joint action’ in conversations 
Infants start understanding words at around 8 months of age (Fenson et al., 1994; 
Harris, Yeeles, Chasin, & Oakley, 1995), and they utter their first word usually 
around their first birthday (e.g., Waxman & Markow, 1995). Their vocabulary 
increases rapidly and the ability to form sentences develops, so that they are able to 
engage in simple and more complex conversation by 3 years of age (Clark, 2003). 
The development of language production and perception has been a huge research 
area of linguists and psychologists for a long time (e.g., McCarthy, 1933). Likewise, 
how conversations work has been a question of interest (e.g., Sacks, Scheglof, & 
Jefferson, 1974; for an overview, see Hutchby & Wooffitt, 2008). But only recently, 
the idea originated to visually present prelinguistic and linguistic children with dyadic 
conversations and measure their gaze behaviour (von Hofsten, Uhlig, Adell, & 
Kochukhova, 2009). The way children shift their gaze between speakers can shed 
light on how they perceive conversations, even if they are not yet able to speak 
themselves. For example, already 6-month-olds could follow a conversation more 
easily if the agents interacted in a face-to-face manner, as opposed to a back-to-back 
interaction, where the speakers looked into opposite directions (Augusti, Melinder, & 
Gredebäck, 2010). In another study, children’s ability to anticipate turn-taking (i.e., a 
change of speaker) in natural conversations was explored. It was found that 3-year-
olds anticipated nearly twice as many turns as 1-year-olds (von Hofsten et al., 2009), 
which could indicate that the developing language experience influenced this ability. 
The two above mentioned studies give only a brief glimpse of how visually presented 
conversations are perceived by prelinguistic and linguistic children. It remains to be 
investigated how language experience (e.g., semantic skills) and other linguistic 
factors influence the perception of conversations. 
1.5. Research Questions 
The preceding overview highlighted the role of experience in children’s action 
perception in three distinct areas, namely, nonverbal individual action, nonverbal 
joint action, and verbal joint action. The main focus of the present dissertation was to 
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further investigate how experience shapes children’s anticipation of action in these 
areas. Accordingly, the present work addresses three main research questions that will 
be detailed in the following.  
1.5.1. The developing link between production and perception of individual 
action 
It has been elaborated previously that the perception of individual action is largely 
dependent on children’s own action skills. A missing detail of this research is, 
however, when action anticipation becomes linked to production during typical 
development. The first study of this dissertation (‘common representation study’) 
aimed to specify whether a common representation of perception and action develops 
as soon as an action emerges, or whether more active experience is necessary for its 
development. To this end, 6- and 12-month-old infants were presented with videos of 
contralateral manual actions (e.g., reaching across the body midline) and their gaze 
latency towards action goals was measured. Additionally, infants’ own contralateral 
reaching skills were tested using a task adopted from Bruner (1969). Contralateral 
reaching emerges in the middle of the first year of life and slowly improves over the 
next months. It is thus particularly useful to determine when a common representation 
between perception and action is established. If a correlation between the two tasks is 
already present in 6-month-olds, this suggests that action perception links to action 
production as soon as infants start producing an action. If a correlation is only present 
in 12-month-olds, this suggests that more active experience is necessary. The study 
outlined above will be described in detail in Chapter 2 of this dissertation (Melzer, 
Prinz, & Daum, 2012).  
1.5.2. The difference between individual and joint action 
As highlighted previously, the research on how children perceive others’ joint action 
by measuring gaze behaviour is relatively new. The few conducted studies have 
mainly focused on the questions when children are able to infer joint goals, and how 
this is influenced by experience. In order to interpret those and future findings, it 
would be helpful to know whether infants’ perception of joint action is essentially 
5. Research Questions 
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different from individual action, or whether they follow the same developmental 
trajectory. In the second study (‘joint action study’), we addressed this question by 
presenting infants and adults with videos of a block-stacking action that was either 
performed by one agent or two agents, and compared their gaze behaviour towards 
action goals. The overarching goal was identical in both conditions (‘to build a 
tower’), only the sub-goals (‘to grasp a block’, ‘to stack it’) differed in that they were 
performed by one or two agents. Infants were 9 and 12 months old, and had little or 
no experience with coordinated joint action themselves, whereas adults are usually 
very experienced in coordinating their actions with others. This experience could 
influence the level of representation that is used to guide an observer’s gaze shifts. If 
participants’ perception of the actions is based on their representation of the 
overarching goal, their gaze behaviour should not be affected by the number of 
agents. If, by contrast, participants represent each agent’s individual sub-goals in 
isolation, switching between the sub-goals of the two agents in the joint-action 
condition could cause delayed gaze shifts. Chapter 3 will present the study 
summarised here (Keitel, Prinz, & Daum, submitted). 
1.5.3. The role of semantics and intonation in the perception of conversations 
Previous research on the perception of conversations using gaze behaviour has shown 
that 3-year-old children anticipate more turns in observed conversations than 1-year-
olds (von Hofsten et al., 2009), which suggests that the older children were better able 
to anticipate the course of the conversation. However, what influences children’s 
anticipation of turns in observed conversations is largely unknown. The third study 
(‘conversation study’) aimed to further explore the perception of conversations by 
investigating the role of two linguistic factors for the anticipation of turns in children 
with more or less language experience. The first factor, semantics (i.e., language 
understanding), was addresses by testing prelinguistic (6 and 12 months) and 
linguistic (24 and 36 months) children, and a control group of adults. The age at 
which children are able to reliably anticipate a speaker’s next turn indicates how 
much language experience is required in order to understand the course of a 
conversation. The second factor, the prosodic cue intonation (i.e., the rise and fall of 
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the voice in speaking), was addressed by presenting two conversations, one with 
normal intonation and one with flattened intonation. Intonational differences are 
already processed by newborns (Nazzi, Floccia, & Bertoncini, 1998; Sambeth, 
Ruohio, Alku, Fellman, & Huotilainen, 2008) and intonation plays a role in early 
word learning (Thiessen, Hill, & Saffran, 2005). It could therefore also support 
children’s perception of conversations. This study will be reported in detail in 
Chapter 4 (Keitel, Prinz, Friederici, von Hofsten, & Daum, 2013). 
1.6. Summary of the Main Results 
Before presenting the studies which address above research questions, I will first 
provide a brief overview of the main results. The common representation study 
(Melzer et al., 2012) addressed the question when during infancy a link between the 
production and the perception of an action is established. To this end, the perception 
and the production of contralateral reaching were tested in 6- and 12-month-old 
infants. The results showed that, as expected, the 12-month-olds performed 
contralateral reaching actions more often than the 6-month-olds. Furthermore, the 12-
month-olds showed anticipatory gaze shifts towards action goals, whereas the 6-
month-olds showed reactive gaze shifts (i.e., their gaze arrived at the goal after the 
action was completed). And, most importantly, a correlation between the two tasks 
was only present in 12-month-olds, but not yet in 6-month-olds. These findings 
suggest that a common representation between action perception and production 
during development is not instantly present. Instead, the formation of such a link 
seems to depend on a certain amount of active experience, or ‘training’, in performing 
an action. 
The joint action study (Keitel et al., submitted) aimed to determine whether infants 
and adults perceive joint action per se different from individual action. We presented 
9- and 12-month-old infants and adults with a block-stacking action that was either 
performed by one agent or two agents. It was found that adults anticipated goals in 
both conditions significantly faster than infants, and their gaze latencies did not differ 
between conditions. By contrast, infants showed faster anticipation of goals in the 
individual condition than in the joint condition. This difference was more pronounced 
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in the younger age group of 9-month-olds. Thus, infants with virtually no coordinated 
joint action skills themselves were unable to use a representation of the overarching 
joint goal of two agents. Infants possibly represented the sub-goals of the block-
stacking action in isolation, which led to delayed gaze shifts in the joint condition, 
when they had to switch between the representations of the two agents’ sub-goals. 
Adults, however, were able to infer the overarching joint goal of two agents, which 
led to comparable gaze behaviour in both conditions. These findings suggest a 
modulating influence of experience on the perception of joint action.  
The conversation study (Keitel et al., 2013) addressed the influence of semantics and 
intonation on the perception of conversations in prelinguistic and linguistic children. 
For this purpose, children of four age groups (6, 12, 24 and 36 months), and adults 
were presented with videos of two dyadic conversations, one with normal and one 
with flattened intonation. The first main finding was that only the 3-year-olds and the 
adults were able to reliably anticipate a speaker’s next turn. Younger children shifted 
their gaze between the speakers regardless of the turn-taking. This indicates that 
extensive language experience is necessary, before semantics are developed 
sufficiently to anticipate the course of a conversation. The second main finding was 
that only 3-year-olds benefited from intonation; in younger age groups, as well as 
adults, the anticipation of turns was not affected by intonation. This suggests that 
intonation only has a supporting role on conversation perception, when language 
understanding is well developed but still not as sophisticated as that of adults. Thus, 
language experience alters the proficiency to use this prosodic cue. 
1.7. Considerations, Limitations, and Perspectives 
The present dissertation aimed to investigate how the increasing experience in 
performing nonverbal and verbal actions and interactions influences children’s and 
adults’ perception of others’ actions in the respective areas. The findings generally 
suggest a significant role of experience in the perception of others’ actions. First, in 
the area of individual action, where a vast amount of studies has focused already on 
the link between experience and action perception, we could add to the existing 
literature that such a link is not instantly present but needs active experience to 
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develop. Second, the perception of visually presented joint action is a relatively new 
research area. We could show that the perception of joint action by infants with 
virtually no experience in coordinated joint action themselves, is essentially different 
from that of individual action. Third, the perception of visually presented 
conversations is also a rather new research area. Here, we could show that it takes up 
to 3 years of language experience, for children to be able to reliably anticipate the 
course of a conversation, and that the age of 3 years is special concerning the use of 
intonation. Thus, each of the studies provided an exciting new piece of the puzzle on 
how children perceive nonverbal and verbal actions and interactions 
The investigated actions differ in the cognitive requirements that are necessary to 
perform and to understand them. The perception of individual action necessitates 
representing the goals of ‘simple motor actions’ by one agent (or elementary motor 
acts, Csibra, 2007). The perception of joint action involves representing the joint goal 
of multiple agents, in addition to the representations of the agents’ simple motor 
actions. The perception of conversations involves representing the semantic and 
syntactic information of a conversation, as well as using prosodic cues, such as 
intonation. The findings of the present dissertation thus demonstrate a significant role 
of experience on action perception on different cognitive levels, from simple motor 
actions to complex conversations. Experience therefore plays a special role during 
development, when new actions and skills are learned constantly. However, it seems 
natural to conclude that experience continues to play a significant role for action 
perception throughout one’s life, which is supported by studies with older and 
younger adults (Cross et al., 2006; Diersch, Cross, Stadler, Schütz-Bosbach, & 
Rieger, 2012). 
A critical aspect that concerns the present work and others’ that address the influence 
of experience on action perception, is that it is difficult to pinpoint exactly what 
active and passive experience contribute to children’s action perception. During 
typical development, both are always entangled. Children learn to produce new 
actions through active experience, and this is known to modulate their action 
perception, but they likewise observe other people’s actions constantly. Empirically, 
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when the production and the perception of an action were measured and the order was 
counterbalanced, production has been found to have a measurable effect on 
subsequent action perception in infants, whereas this was not the case vice versa 
(Cannon et al., 2012; Sommerville et al., 2008; Sommerville, Blumenthal, Venema, 
& Braun, 2011; Hauf & Prinz, 2004). A notable exception forms observational 
learning of some means-end, or action-effect relations, which has previously been 
found in infants and young children (Provasi, Dubon, & Bloch, 2001; Abravanel & 
Gingold, 1985; Hauf & Aschersleben, 2008). For the common representation study 
(chapter two), the production of contralateral reaching was tested and thus active 
experience targeted. The study showed a modulating influence of infants’ production 
skills on their perception, which corroborates the predominant role of active 
experience. In the joint action study (chapter three), no such measure was obtained 
but it was assumed that older children and adults have more experience than younger 
children. Here, the role of active experience on the perception of joint action is 
thought to be comparable to that of individual action (Henderson et al., 2013; 
Schmitow & Kochukhova, 2013). Yet, the influence of extensive visual experience 
on the production, and consequentially on the perception of actions during normal 
development should not be underestimated. For example, the notion of a positive 
impact of action observation on the motor system has been supported by an 
interesting study concerning rehabilitation after stroke in adults (Ertelt et al., 2007). 
Here, physical training was combined with a concomitant action observation therapy, 
in which participants observed everyday actions over a period of 4 weeks. 
Participants’ motor functions improved significantly compared with a control group, 
which received only physical training. The reason for this was thought to be a 
reactivation of motor areas through visual training. In a study with elite basketball 
players and ‘expert watchers’ (basketball coaches and journalists), it has been found 
that, although the players could predict basketball shots earlier and more accurately 
than watchers and novices, both players and watchers showed an increase in 
corticospinal excitability during observation of basketball actions, whereas novices 
did not (Aglioti, Cesari, Romani, & Urgesi, 2008). This suggests that the motor 
system of individuals with extensive visual experience was activated comparably to 
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that of individuals with active experience when observing domain-specific actions. 
The findings of the above studies show a persistent influence of visual experience on 
the motor system and thus on action production. Infants also show an activation of 
motor areas when observing actions that are implemented in their own motor 
repertoire (e.g., Southgate, Johnson, El Karoui, & Csibra, 2010), which could support 
an influence of visual experience on action production during typical development. 
Although this could not yet be determined experimentally – perhaps because in 
experiments, actions are usually only presented for a few seconds – a reciprocal 
relationship between perception and production of actions in infants, and therefore 
between active and visual experience, is likely. This is also predicted by the common 
coding approach (Prinz, 1990, 1997), and accepted in adults. 
Similar to manual actions, the production and the perception of language are 
inextricably linked (Pickering & Garrod, 2013). However, the ability to understand 
language (i.e., semantics) precedes production during development (Benedict, 1979). 
Further, semantics is assumed to predominantly modulate the ability to predict the 
end of turns (De Ruiter, Mitterer, & Enfield, 2006; Magyari & de Ruiter, 2012), 
which modulated gaze behaviour in the conversation study (chapter four). Thus, there 
seems to be a predominant role of passive experience (language perception, or 
semantics) over active experience (language production) in the perception of 
conversations. Although the role of active and passive experience on the perception 
of nonverbal and verbal actions seems to be reversed, the main message remains the 
same: production and perception are linked, and thus active and passive experience 
can influence action perception.  
As the results of the present work were obtained experimentally, they are necessarily 
reductionist, and the aspect of ecological validity has to be considered critically. For a 
topic as inherently social as action perception, this reductionism might appear 
somewhat unfortunate. However, the advantages of this approach outweigh concerns 
about its ecological validity. One issue is the missing context in the present studies, 
especially in the studies concerning nonverbal action (chapter two and three). The 
context in which an action is embedded usually provides additional information on 
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others’ intentions (Stapel, Hunnius, & Bekkering, 2012; Kilner et al., 2007) and 
supports action understanding (Iacoboni et al., 2005; Fogassi et al., 2005). Thus, the 
present results relate to the essential parts of action perception (that of the movement 
and the goal), neglecting contextual information. Disregarding the context provided 
unambiguous and valid information on how children anticipate others’ action goals. 
Another issue is that participants watched videos of actions instead of a ‘live 
performance’. The social aspect of action perception is reduced in videos, which 
could be due to the two-dimensional nature of stimuli and/or because observers have 
no motivation to react towards the actors. Further, adults and infants have been found 
to show decreased activation of motor areas when observing video stimuli, compared 
with live stimuli (Shimada & Hiraki, 2006). For these reasons, it might have been 
more difficult for participants to build representations of the actions observed in 
video sequences. Although other infant studies have implemented live performance of 
actions (e.g., Woodward, 1998), those have analysed looking time. In order to 
measure anticipatory gaze, the exact analysis of eye movements is essential, which 
precludes the use of live performances if remote eye trackers are to be used. Besides 
this technical issue, the use of videos in the present work provided further benefits, 
including improved objectivity and economic advantages.  
We chose to use a single-method approach to investigate the development of action 
perception, because the use of anticipatory gaze provides equal insight into infants’, 
children’s and adults’ anticipation of action goals, and can be realised readily with 
any age group. In future research, our findings could be extended by using additional 
methods, for example, electrophysiological measures, such as electroencephalography 
(EEG), or spectroscopic measures, such as near infrared spectroscopy (NIRS). Both 
can also be adopted with infants, and could provide additional information on action 
perception. With EEG and NIRS, it is possible to measure neural activity related to 
motor activation and thus participants’ motor simulation during action perception. 
Furthermore, the present findings give rise to a more fine-grained investigation of the 
developmental trajectories of action perception in the future. In the common 
representation study (chapter two), we found a link between perception and action of 
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contralateral reaching in 12-, but not in 6-month-olds. It is possible that such a link is 
already established earlier, with less than 6 months active experience in contralateral 
reaching. In the joint action study (chapter three), the older infant group of 12-month-
olds still showed a differential perception of individual and joint action, although less 
so than 9-month-olds. We have reason to believe that children in the first half of their 
second year of life would show a gaze behaviour comparable to that of adults 
(Henderson & Woodward, 2011; Fawcett & Gredebäck, 2013), but within the present 
paradigm, this remains to be determined experimentally. Similarly, in the 
conversation study (chapter four), 3-year-old children’s gaze behaviour was 
approaching that of adults regarding their general ability to anticipate turns, but in 
contrast to adults, they showed differential perception of conversations with and 
without intonation. It is an interesting question at which age children are able to 
compensate the missing intonation by relying on language understanding. Thus, in the 
same way as the studies of this dissertation provide new and intriguing findings, they 
open a variety of new questions. 
Coming back to the quote by Julius Caesar ‘Experience is the teacher of all things’, 
our findings suggest that experience 1) teaches our brain to link action perception to 
action production, 2) teaches us to perceive joint action similarly to individual action, 
and 3) teaches us to perceive conversations based on language understanding as 
opposed to formal prosodic cues such as intonation. Furthermore, the present 
dissertation added to the increasing literature, showing that infants have remarkable 
skills in identifying others’ goals, and become ‘familiar’ with others’ actions more 
quickly than Jean Piaget’s solipsistic view implied. In the following, the studies 
summarised above will be presented in detail. 
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Abstract 
The goal of the present study was to measure infants’ action production and 
perception skills with tasks that both include goal anticipation, in a within-subject 
design. In the production task, the frequency of 6- and 12-month-old infants’ 
contralateral reaching movements was examined. In the perception task, videos of 
contralateral movements being performed were presented to the same infants and 
anticipatory eye movements were analysed. The main findings were: (1) 12-month-
olds used their contralateral hand more frequently than 6- month-olds; (2) 12-month-
olds mainly anticipated the goals of observed actions, whereas 6-month-olds mainly 
followed the action; finally, and most importantly, (3) at 12 months, production and 
perception were linked, but at 6 months, this was not yet the case. Our results show 
that anticipatory eye movements do not instantly reflect infants’ reaching production. 
A certain amount of experience is required to establish a common representation of 
the production and the perception of reaching movements.  
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1. Introduction 
The production of an action and the perception of the same action are closely linked 
in adults. The interplay of these two skills is described in detail by the Common 
Coding Principle (Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; Prinz, 1990, 
1997). It specifies that production and perception of actions share a common abstract 
representation, providing a basis for a bidirectional influence between both action 
production and perception. In adults, it is well established that action perception can 
facilitate or interfere with action production, which is usually examined in shortened 
or prolonged reaction times in the execution of actions (Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 
2001; Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000; Craighero, Bello, Fadiga, & 
Rizzolatti, 2002; Kilner, Paulignan, & Blakemore, 2003). In the same manner, action 
production can facilitate or interfere with the processing of observed actions 
(Hamilton, Wolpert, & Frith, 2004; Jacobs & Shiffrar, 2005; Miall et al., 2006; Wühr 
& Müsseler, 2001). The idea of a common representation of action production and 
perception gained support with the discovery of the mirror-neuron system (MNS) in 
monkeys and humans, which consists of neurons that fire both when an action is 
produced and when it is observed (for a review, see Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). In 
contrast to the well-documented common representation of action production and 
perception in adults, less is known about its development. Some authors consider this 
link innate (Bertenthal & Longo, 2007; Lepage & Théoret, 2007) whereas others 
think it develops at some point early in life (Del Giudice, Manera, & Keysers, 2009; 
Keysers & Perrett, 2004). 
In infant research, the link between action production and action perception is often 
only theoretically addressed. Commonly, the results obtained in an observation 
paradigm (e.g. looking times) are related to a behavioural skill that is typically 
present in older but not in younger infants, without measuring individual behavioural 
skills (Daum & Gredebäck, 2011; Daum, Vuori, et al., 2009; Falck-Ytter et al., 2006; 
Longo & Bertenthal, 2006). However, to investigate the development of this link in 
infants, it would be preferable to measure both action production and perception, (a) 
within the same infants, and (b) using highly comparable tasks. 
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An increasing number of studies have investigated the link between action production 
and perception directly, using within-subject designs. For example, Daum et al. 
(2011) found a link between 6-month-old infants’ grasping level (palmar vs. thump 
opposition) and their looking times to unexpected grasping actions (i.e. large hand 
aperture for small objects and vice versa; see also Loucks & Sommerville, 2012). 
Sommerville & Woodward (2005) found a link between infants’ performance in a 
means-end task (pulling a cloth to retrieve a toy) and their perception of such an 
action in a visual habituation task. Here, infants’ own level of planful behaviour was 
found to be correlated with their dishabituation time. A modulating effect of action 
production on perception was found in several studies, for example, using different 
means-end paradigms (Needham, Barrett, & Peterman, 2002; Cannon et al., 2012), 
which also supports the idea of a link between both competencies. Sommerville et al. 
(2005) used grasping actions and demonstrated an influence of action production on 
action perception in infants as young as 3 months of age. An effect of action 
perception on infants’ own action production (usually in observational learning 
paradigms) has also been shown using actions such as button presses (Hauf & 
Aschersleben, 2008), tool-use paradigms (Abravanel & Gingold, 1985) or means-end 
paradigms (Provasi et al., 2001). 
A fundamental problem that concerns most of these studies is the comparability of 
tasks for action production and perception. Action production per se includes the 
anticipation of a goal (von Hofsten, 2004). Performing a goal-directed action 
automatically entails the anticipation of a future event or a goal state. In contrast, 
many of the tasks used to measure action perception include a post hoc evaluation of 
an action. That means, the outcome of an action is presented and infants’ reactions 
(often looking times) to this outcome are measured after the action is completed. 
Examples are the preferential looking paradigm (Cicchino & Rakison, 2008), 
habituation paradigms (Sommerville et al., 2008; Sommerville & Woodward, 
2005) and observational learning (Abravanel & Gingold, 1985; Hauf & Aschersleben, 
2008). Recent studies have found a dissociation between the post hoc evaluation, 
assessed by looking times or pupil dilation, and anticipatory measures assessed by 
anticipatory gaze shifts (Daum, Attig, Gunawan, Prinz, & Gredebäck, in press; 
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Gredebäck & Melinder, 2010). Measures that assess the post hoc evaluation of an 
action outcome were found to indicate much earlier comprehension of action goals in 
infants than measures that assess the anticipation of an action outcome. 
The goal of the present study was to bridge this gap. Infants’ processing of goal-
directed reaching actions in the perception task was studied via anticipatory eye 
movements, a measure that involves similar anticipatory components as the 
production of a goal-directed reaching action. Both of our tasks included the same 
action: contralateral reaching. In the action production task, infants’ own ability to 
reach contralaterally was tested; in the action perception task, participants watched a 
model perform contralateral reaching and transport movements. 
Reaching within one side of the body midline (i.e. ipsilateral reaching) develops at 
about 3–4 months of age (Morange & Bloch, 1996; White et al., 1964). Reaching 
across the body midline (i.e. contralateral reaching) develops somewhat later. Bruner 
(1969) called the observation that infants do not reach across the body midline from 
the beginning the ‘mysterious midline barrier’. He wrote that ‘if a toy is held before 
the hand of an infant after he has already grasped something in that hand, the 
contralateral hand will not reach across the midline to get it.’ (p. 276). He suggested 
that the midline barrier disappears at 7 months (i.e. that infants suddenly reach 
contralaterally at this age). Supporting this, the onset of spontaneous midline crossing 
with one hand was found around 7 months of age (Morange & Bloch, 1996). 
However, if the ipsilateral arm was restrained, contralateral reaching was already 
found at the age of 4 months (Provine & Westerman, 1979). In the context of 
bimanual reaching (i.e. using both hands to grasp a large object on one side of the 
body midline), spontaneous midline crossing could be observed in infants as young as 
3 months; hence, bimanual reaching can be considered a precursor of unimanual 
contralateral reaching (van Hof, van der Kamp, & Savelsbergh, 2002). The different 
results concerning the age of onset can be accounted for by differences in the methods 
that were used (i.e. spontaneous vs. restrained, and unimanual vs. bimanual reaching). 
Interestingly, even though the age of onset varied, all studies found a rather slow 
increase in the use of contralateral reaching, as opposed to a strict threshold proposed 
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by Bruner. It is only at the age of 8–9 years that an adult-like level of spontaneous 
midline crossing is achieved (Cermak, Quintero, & Cohen, 1980; Schofield, 1976). 
In the present study, infants’ contralateral reaching was tested adopting the paradigm 
described by Bruner (i.e. occupying one hand and presenting a second toy). This 
method presents a compromise between restricted and spontaneous midline crossing. 
An extensive pilot study was conducted to get an exact developmental outline of 
contralateral reaching with this method. Fifty-eight participants in four age groups 
were tested (6, 7, 8 and 14 months). Results yielded a linear increase in contralateral 
reaching,
1 
indicating that this method makes it possible to differentiate between levels 
of contralateral reaching production in infants. At 6 months, infants are well able to 
reach ipsilaterally. We measured how often infants ‘broke the habit’ and used the 
contralateral hand. Thus, the task quantified their skill, or propensity, to reach 
contralaterally. It was, however, not appropriate to examine differences in infants’ 
ipsilateral reaching skills as a decrease in ipsilateral reaching with this paradigm does 
not mean that infants’ ipsilateral reaching skills deteriorate. The slow increase of 
contralateral reaching with this paradigm is particularly useful to study the 
development of a link between action production and perception. 
In the perception task, participants’ gaze behaviour was evaluated. Measurement of 
anticipatory eye movements has been used as an indicator for action perception in 
adults (Flanagan & Johansson, 2003) as well as in infants (Falck-Ytter et al., 2006; 
Gredebäck et al., 2009; von Hofsten et al., 2009). In their seminal study, Flanagan 
and Johansson (2003) recorded eye movements of participants during the execution 
of a block-stacking task and during their perception of the same task. They found 
highly similar gaze patterns engaged in the production of actions and the perception 
of others’ actions, which strongly supports a common underlying mechanism for both 
competences. This method is easily adaptable to young infants (Falck-Ytter et al., 
2006) and provides a powerful instrument for assessing infants’ action perception. 
                                                 
1
 Mean percent values and standard deviations of contralateral reactions in four age groups: 6-month-
olds (N = 14): M = 19.58%, SD = 14.00%; 7-month-olds (N = 15): M = 23.76%, SD = 12.34%; 8-
month-olds (N = 15): M = 28.50%, SD = 13.72%; 14-month-olds (N = 14): M = 42.37%, SD = 10.67. 
Linear trend: R
2
 = .31, p < .001. 
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The idea for the complementary perception task in this study was based on the study 
by Falck-Ytter et al. (2006), who presented videos of a model reaching for a ball and 
placing it in a bucket, and recorded each participant's gaze. They found that 6-month-
olds showed reactive eye movements towards the goal of the action, whereas 12-
month-olds, as well as adults, showed anticipatory eye movements. We modified the 
paradigm by adding a second condition with contralateral arm movements performed 
by the model. Since we exclusively measured the progress of contralateral reaching in 
the production task, only observed contralateral movements were analysed to match 
the production task. Additionally, and in contrast to Falck-Ytter et al. (2006), not only 
transport movements but also reaching movements were analysed. 
The action production and perception tasks included similar anticipatory components 
of the same action. This allowed us to compare the production and the perception of 
this action in a within-subject design and gain more insight into the development of a 
common representation of both competences. Based on the study by Falck-Ytter et al. 
(2006), two age groups of infants were tested: 6- and 12-month-olds. An additional 
group of adults participated in the perception task to provide information about the 
developmental ‘end point’ of action anticipation. These data were not included in the 
statistical analysis, however, as not to distort the results of children's development. 
We expected to find a correlation between the two tasks if action production and 
perception of contralateral reaching already share a common representation in the 
first year of life. The crucial question was, however, at what point in development 
such a common representation develops. It is possible that a common representation 
is present as soon as infants start performing an action, or that a certain amount of 
experience is necessary. In the former case, we would find a correlation at 6 and 12 
months of age, in the latter case, such a correlation would only be present at 12 
months of age.  
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2. Method 
2.1. Participants 
In each of the three age groups, 24 participants successfully took part in the study. 
Groups consisted of 6-month-old infants (15 girls, 9 boys; mean age = 6 months; 
0 days; age range = 5;15 to 6;15), 12-month-old infants (10 girls, 14 boys; mean 
age = 12;3; age range = 11;19 to 12;13), and adults (12 female, 12 male; mean 
age = 25.4 years; age range = 20–33). 
Additionally, twenty-eight 6-month-old infants were tested but were not included in 
the final data analysis, with two infants not providing enough trials in either task. In 
the production task, a total of three infants did not complete the task due to fussiness. 
In the perception task, data from twenty-seven 6-month-olds (including two also 
excluded from the production task) were excluded from the final analysis because 
they were inattentive to the stimuli (n = 19) or because of insufficient signal quality 
(n = 8). The high exclusion rate in the present study is partially due to a block design 
(see Procedure Section 2.3.). However, it is still comparable with the one of other eye 
tracking studies with young infants, where it is often found to be approximately 50% 
(for an overview, see Haith, 2004). Ten 12-month-old infants were not included in the 
final data analysis because they did not provide enough trials in the production task 
(n = 6) or in the perception task (n = 4; 2 were inattentive and 2 had insufficient 
signal quality). The data from one additional adult who participated in the action 
perception task had to be excluded due to insufficient signal quality. Contact 
information of infants was obtained from public birth records; the group of adult 
participants consisted of students. Infants, as well as adults, received a small gift as 
compensation for their participation. The study was approved by the local ethics 
committee of the University of Leipzig, and conducted in accordance with the 
Declaration of Helsinki. 
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2.2. Apparatus and Stimuli 
Both tasks were conducted in the same testing room, which was divided into two 
separate parts by an opaque curtain. The room was unfurnished apart from the testing 
equipment. 
For the production task, infants and parents sat on a chair in front of a table with a cut 
out area (see Figure 2.1), and the experimenter sat opposite them. To occupy one of 
the infant's hands, a small red cube (width = 2.5 cm) was used. Three different toys 
(roughly 6 cm × 6 cm), attached to 25 cm long sticks, were used as second object to 
be held in front of the infant. The toys were designed to be very appealing for infants; 
they were all multi-coloured and made different sounds (rattling and different 
chiming sounds) when they were moved. 
 
Figure 2.1. Schematic drawing of the production task. The infant was given a cube (occupation object) 
in either his/her left or right hand. Subsequently, a second toy (target object) was held either (a) in 
front of the empty hand to elicit an ipsilateral reaction (ipsilateral presentation) or (b) in front of the 
occupied hand to elicit a contralateral reaction (contralateral presentation). 
Videos in the perception task were presented on a corneal reflection eye tracker 
(Tobii 1750, Stockholm, Sweden) with an infant add-on (precision: 1°, accuracy: 
0.5°). Videos subtended a visual angle of approximately 27.5° × 15.2°. Stimulus 
presentation and data acquisition were accomplished using the software ClearView 
2.7.1. Eye movements were recorded at a rate of 50 Hz. A 9-point infant calibration 
was used. Infants sat in a safety car seat (Maxi Cosi Cabrio) at a distance of 
approximately 60 cm from the monitor. 
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Each video showed a model reaching for a ball and dropping it into a bucket; the 
action therefore consisted of two separable movements: reaching and transporting. 
The bucket had a chicken head on it which moved and made a sound when the ball 
was dropped into it to make the goal of the entire action more salient (Falck-Ytter et 
al., 2006). Two different versions of the video were presented. One showed the model 
starting with an ipsilateral reaching movement, followed by a contralateral transport 
movement from the location of the ball to the bucket in the transport phase (referred 
to as ipsi-first trial; Figure 2.2 a). The other video showed the model starting with a 
contralateral reaching movement, with the corresponding transport phase consisting 
of an ipsilateral transport phase (referred to as contra-first trial; Figure 2.2 b). Only 
the contralateral reaching or transport movement of each trial was analysed. The 
colour of the ball differed between trials (red, blue and yellow); in all other respects, 
the videos were identical. Mirrored versions of all videos were produced to 
counterbalance potential hand and side effects. Each video had a total duration of 
5280 ms. The reaching movement started 400 ms after video onset (during the first 
400 ms, a still picture was shown, see left panel of Figure 2.2). Reaching movements 
took 760 ms and transport movements took 1120 ms. Between trials, salient attention 
grabbers were presented, consisting of a moving toy accompanied by a brief 
attention-grabbing sound (visual angles approximately 7° × 8°). 
 
Figure 2.2. Still pictures of stimulus videos in the perception task. Pictures show the starting position 
of the reaching movement (left column), end position of the reaching movement/starting position of 
the transport movement (middle column) and end position of the transport movement (right column). 
Upper row (a) displays an ipsi-first trial, bottom row (b) a contra-first trial including AOIs indicated by 
white boxes. The pictures in black frames indicate end positions of the contralateral movements that 
were analysed. 
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2.3. Procedure 
Upon arrival, parents were informed about the procedure (without disclosing the 
exact purpose of the study) and gave informed consent. After the infant was 
familiarised with the experimenter, the parent and infant were led to the testing room. 
All infants were tested individually with one parent present. The perception task was 
always conducted before behavioural testing of the infant's reaching production. This 
procedure has also been used in previous studies (Daum, Vuori, et al., 2009; Daum & 
Gredebäck, 2011). More importantly, we were not interested in immediate effects of 
action production on action perception or vice versa, but in an underlying, existing 
common representation. For this matter, it was advisable to conduct the perception 
task first in order to weaken potential interference of any immediate learning effects. 
Observational experience has been found to be less likely to have an influence on 
infants’ action production than vice versa (Cannon et al., 2012; Sommerville et al., 
2011). It is only in this section that the perception task will be described before the 
production task. 
Perception task. The parent placed the infant in the safety car seat and sat down on a 
chair behind the infant. Once infant and parent were comfortable, the stimulus 
presentation was started. Parents were allowed to comfort their child if necessary but 
were otherwise asked to remain silent. After the calibration procedure, the 
experimenter started the video presentation. A maximum of 30 trials were presented 
(each consisting of a reaching and a transport movement) in order to obtain a reliable 
measure of infants’ gaze behaviour. Ipsi-first and contra-first trials were presented in 
two separate blocks of 15 trials each. The order of the presentation of the blocks was 
counterbalanced across participants. After three consecutive trials, the attention 
grabber was shown until the infant looked at the screen before the next three trials 
were presented. The task was terminated if infants became fussy during presentation. 
The calibration procedure took 1–3 min, and testing of the perception task took 
approximately 3.5 min. 
Production task. Subsequently, the production task assessing the infant's own 
contralateral reaching behaviour was conducted by the same experimenter in the other 
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part of the testing room. The infant sat on his or her parent's lap and was given a 
small cube (occupation object) in either their left or their right hand (order 
counterbalanced). Subsequently, a second toy (target object) was held alternately 
either in front of the infant's empty hand (to elicit an ipsilateral reaction; Figure 2.1 a) 
or in front of their occupied hand (to elicit a contralateral reaction with the empty 
hand; Figure 2.1 b). After the infant reacted, or after a waiting period of at least 5 s, 
this procedure was repeated. After six trials, the occupation object was placed in the 
other hand and the procedure repeated. This resulted in a total of 12 trials (6 
ipsilateral and 6 contralateral presentations). The reactions to both forms of 
presentations were analysed. Ipsilateral presentations were not absolutely necessary 
for assessing contralateral reaching skills but enhanced the number of valid trials per 
infant and were also encouraging infants to continue with the task. A trial was 
repeated immediately if the infant dropped the occupation object or gave it away 
before the target object was presented. The behavioural testing procedure took 
approximately 6 min. Overall, each parent-infant pair spent approximately 1 h in the 
laboratory. 
The adults only participated in the perception task, since adults are capable of 
reaching contralaterally (Helbig & Gabbard, 2004) and no variance in their reaching 
production was expected within the present paradigm. After they were informed 
about the procedure, they gave informed consent and were led to the testing room. 
Adults watched the same videos as the infants. 
2.4. Coding and Analysis 
Production task. The frequency of ipsilateral and contralateral reactions in the 
production task was analysed from video recordings. Infants who showed fewer than 
six valid trials were excluded from further analysis. A trial was categorised to be 
valid if the infant focused on the toy when reaching for it to avoid counting non-goal-
directed behaviour. Furthermore, we only included trials where the infant 
unmistakably held the cube in one hand until a reaction was shown. As reactions, we 
considered taking, grasping or touching the toy with one hand or with both hands. 
Bimanual reactions were also included in the category of contralateral reactions, since 
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they always include the contralateral hand. We furthermore considered trials as valid 
where the infant looked at the toy for at least 5 s but did not move; these trials were 
labelled as ‘no reaction’. 
The mean number of valid trials was 8.9 (74.2%) for 6-month-olds and 9.0 (75.0%) 
for 12-month-olds. The fact that we obtained a nearly identical number of valid trials 
supports the assumption that the task could be managed equally well by both infant 
age groups. Furthermore, there was no difference between the number of valid 
ipsilateral and contralateral presentations that infants received (p > .33 in both age 
groups). Thus, the reactions to both forms of presentations could be merged. The 
number of different reactions was calculated as relative frequency, resulting in 
percent values of contralateral, ipsilateral and no reactions for each infant. For 
example, if an infant were to always grasp the toy with the empty hand, it would get 
an ipsilateral reaching score of 50%, a contralateral reaching score of 50%, and 0% 
no reactions. This means, a contralateral reaching score of 50% reflects the most 
sophisticated reaching production.
2
 If, however, an infant were to touch the toy with 
the occupied hand (or drop the occupation object in order to grasp the toy) in 3 trials, 
it would get an ipsilateral score of 75% and a contralateral score of 25%. All trials 
were coded by two independent raters, who assigned the same category in 92.2% of 
the trials. 
Perception task. Eye movements were analysed using Matlab 7.1 (The MathWorks 
Inc.). Three areas of interest (AOIs) were defined (see Figure 2.2 b) surrounding the 
starting point of the reaching movement (visual angle 10.5° × 5.6°), the ball 
(5.5° × 5.6°) and the bucket (6.8° × 8.3°). The time it took for the gaze to arrive (gaze 
arrival time) at goal areas (i.e. the ball AOI and the bucket AOI) relative to the time 
the model's hand arrived was calculated. Eye movements were categorised as 
anticipatory if the gaze preceded the arrival of the hand (positive gaze arrival times). 
If the gaze followed the hand, eye movements were classed as reactive (negative gaze 
                                                 
2
A score of 50% contralateral and 50% ipsilateral reactions could, in theory, also be achieved if an 
infant reacted in a different, and perhaps non-sophisticated manner, namely, if he or she always reacted 
with the occupied hand. However, the unusual case that infants reacted with their occupied hand 
during ipsilateral presentation (Figure 2.1 a) only occurred in 1.9% of presentations. 
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arrival times). In addition to these exact gaze arrival times, the relative frequency of 
anticipatory eye movements is reported (i.e. number of anticipated movements 
divided by the total number of observed movements). Only observed contralateral 
arm movements were taken into account. These were subsumed regardless of their 
occurrence in the reaching or transport phase. Trials were only included when 
participants looked at the starting position of the movement before they shifted gaze 
to the ball AOI or bucket AOI. The minimum time participants had to look at the 
starting position of the movement was set to 100 ms. This restriction ensured that 
only trials where the arm movement was watched from the beginning were taken into 
account, and reduced the likelihood of including random gaze shifts in the data 
analysis. Only participants who attentively watched at least 10 of the 30 contralateral 
movements were included in further analyses to ensure the reliability of data. The 
mean number of valid contralateral movements observed was 15.7 (52.2%) for 6-
month-olds, 18.5 (61.6%) for 12-month-olds and 24.4 (81.4%) for adults. 
Statistical analyses of the differences between age groups in the production task and 
the perception task were calculated using t-tests and Chi-Square tests. For analyses of 
the relationship between the production and the perception task, Pearson correlations 
were calculated. As correction for multiple testing, a Fisher's omnibus test was used. 
We report pvalues two-tailed throughout (except for the Fisher's omnibus test, where 
it is generally one-tailed); a significance level of .05 was adopted for all statistical 
tests in this study. 
3. Results 
3.1. Production Task 
The relative frequency of contralateral, ipsilateral and no reactions for 6- and 12-
month-old infants are shown in Figure 2.3. The frequency of contralateral reactions 
increased with age (from M6 months = 18.88%, SD = 15.93% to M12 months = 30.72%, 
SD = 15.35%, t(46) = 2.26, p = .01. Likewise, the frequency of ipsilateral reactions 
decreased (from M6 months = 80.42%, SD = 15.43% to M12 months = 67.59%, 
SD = 15.82%), t(46) = 2.85, p < .01. No difference was found in the frequency of no 
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reactions (from M6 months = 0.69%, SD = 3.40% to M12 months = 1.69%, SD = 5.08%), 
t(46) = 0.80, p = .43. 
                   
Figure 2.3. Infants’ reaching production. Mean frequency of infants’ reactions in the production task 
with standard errors. A frequency of 50% each for ipsilateral and contralateral reactions would 
represent the most sophisticated reaching production possible. From 6 to 12 months, the frequency of 
contralateral reactions increased (p = .03). 
3.2. Perception Task 
Gaze arrival times and relative frequencies of anticipated contralateral movements in 
the perception task of 6- and 12-month-old infants, and also for adults, are shown in 
Figure 2.4. A t-test between 6- and 12-month-old infants for mean gaze arrival times 
reached significance t(2,46) = 8.40, p < .001; 12-month-old infants showed earlier 
gaze arrival times than 6-month-olds. Likewise, a t-test for relative frequencies of 
anticipated contralateral movements showed that 12-month-olds anticipated more 
contralateral movements than 6-month-olds (M6 months = 19.1%, SD = 3.2%, 
M12 months = 61.8%, SD = 3.8%), t(2,46) = 8.46, p < .001. 
Six-month-old infants showed mainly reactive eye movements (i.e. gaze arrival times 
smaller than zero; M = –207.12 ms, SD = 179.11 ms), t(23) = 5.67, p < .001. By 
contrast, 12-month-old infants showed mainly anticipatory eye movements (i.e. gaze 
arrival times larger than zero; M = 197.85 ms, SD = 154.05 ms), t(23) = 6.29, 
p < .001, as did the adults (M = 413.66 ms, SD = 113.66 ms), t(23) = 17.83, p < .001. 
The number of participants who anticipated the goals of observed movements 
confirmed these data. In the group of 6-month-old infants, 21 of 24 showed overall 
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gaze arrival times smaller than zero, χ2 = 13.5, p < .001. In the group of 12-month-old 
infants, 22 of 24 showed gaze arrival times larger than zero, χ2 = 16.67, p < .001; as 
did all adults, χ2 = 24, p < .001. 
 
                        
Figure 2.4. Gaze behaviour with respect to contralateral movements observed. (a) Bars show mean 
gaze arrival times relative to the arm movement observed, with standard errors. Time point zero on the 
y-axis refers to the moment in the video when the hand enters the goal area (i.e. either ball AOI or 
bucket AOI). Positive values indicate that gaze arrived at the goal areas before the hand did; negative 
values indicate that gaze arrived after the hand. (b) Bars show mean relative frequency of anticipated 
arm movements, with standard errors. The difference between 6- and 12-month-olds reached 
significance (**p < .001). Gaze behaviour of adults is informative and was not included in statistical 
analyses. 
3.3. Interrelation of Production and Perception Task 
Correlations between the performance in the production task and gaze behaviour in 
the perception task were separately calculated for both infant age groups. As 
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measurement of the performance in the production task, we calculated the ratio of 
contralateral to ipsilateral reactions: Ncontralateral/Nipsilateral. This resulted in a value 
between 0 and 1, with 1 being the most sophisticated reaching production. 
As measurement of gaze behaviour in the perception task, gaze arrival times at goal 
areas for contralateral movements were used. For the 6-month-old infants, no 
significant correlation was found, r = .22, p = .31. By contrast, for the 12-month-old 
infants, a significant correlation between their reaching production and observed 
contralateral movements was found, r = .45, p = .03. This means, the more 
sophisticated infants’ reaching production was at 12 months, the earlier they 
anticipated other's contralateral movements. 
To rule out the possibility that the correlation between the action production and 
perception task in 6-month-olds did not become significant because their data was 
noisier, a Levené’s test for variance homogeneity was conducted. Participants in the 
two infant age groups did not show differences in variance in either the production 
task or the perception task (F(1,46) = 0.00, p = .96; F(1,46) = 1.58, p = .22, 
respectively). Furthermore, to assess the accuracy of correlations in the two infant age 
groups, a permutation technique was used (i.e. the jackknife; Efron, 1979). Here, one 
pair of the sample n is left out and a correlation coefficient is calculated with the 
remaining sample (n − 1). This procedure is repeated with each pair left out once. The 
resulting n correlation coefficients can be used to estimate a bias. This bias describes 
the ‘tendency of the sample correlation to overestimate or underestimate the true, 
unknown correlation’ (Efron & Tibshirani, 1998). In particular with infant 
participants, where the variability is usually very high, this is also a way to assess the 
impact of outliers. For 6-month-olds, our sample correlation (r = .22) probably 
overestimated the true correlation by biasjack = 0.004 (resulting in a correlation of 
r = .21). For 12-month-olds, our sample correlation (r = .45) probably underestimated 
the true correlation by biasjack = −0.023 (resulting in a correlation of r = .47). This can 
be interpreted as follows: the correlations we found in our samples are in good 
accordance with the true correlations in the population. In 12-month-old infants, the 
true correlation is probably slightly higher than in our sample. 
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Additionally, we calculated the correlation between the performance in the 
production task and the frequency of anticipated contralateral movements for both 
infant age groups. Again, there was no significant correlation for 6-month-olds 
(r = .16, p = .47). For 12-month-olds, the correlation approached significance 
(r = .35, p = .09). Using the jackknife technique again, a bias was estimated that 
indicated how accurate these correlations were. In 6-month-olds, the true correlation 
was probably underestimated by biasjack = −0.018 (resulting in a correlation of 
r = .17). In 12-month-olds, the true correlation was probably underestimated as well, 
by the value biasjack = −0.029 (resulting in a correlation of r = .38). This means, our 
sample correlations were close to, or slightly lower than, the true correlations in the 
population. 
To account for multiple testing, a Fisher's omnibus test was used, combining the p 
values of the two correlations in 12-month-olds (Haccou & Meelis, 1994). This 
procedure revealed significance (χ2 = 11.95, df = 4, p < .02), which indicates that 
these results were not a by-product of multiple testing, but that indeed there was a 
correlation between action production and perception in 12-month-olds. 
4. Discussion 
In the present study, the aim was to shed more light on the development of a common 
representation of action production and perception with two tasks that focused on 
anticipatory components and were more comparable than those reported in previous 
studies. For this purpose, we combined a paradigm for testing the production of 
contralateral reaching with a paradigm for testing the perception of contralateral 
reaching and transport movements in a within-subject design. The tasks were 
conducted with 6- and 12-month-old infants. In the production task, contralateral 
reaching was tested using a paradigm proposed by Bruner (1969); this yielded an 
increase in contralateral reaching with age. In the perception task, infants watched 
videos of a model performing reaching and transport movements while their eye 
movements were recorded. At 12 months, most infants were able to anticipate the 
goal of contralateral movements, whereas at 6 months, infants showed mainly 
reactive eye movements. Production and perception of contralateral reaching 
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movements were correlated at 12 months of age. The more sophisticated 12-month-
olds’ reaching production was, the better they anticipated other people's contralateral 
movements. Importantly, perception and production were not yet correlated at 6 
months. The lack of a significant correlation was neither due to a larger variance in 
the younger infant group nor to the influence of a bias in our sample. Accordingly, 
our findings suggest that a link between production and perception of contralateral 
arm movements, and possibly therefore a common representation, develops in the 
second half of the first year of life. 
Our findings extend those of previous studies which showed a link between action 
production and perception in infants (Abravanel & Gingold, 1985; Hauf & 
Aschersleben, 2008; Provasi et al., 2001; Sommerville et al., 2008; Sommerville & 
Woodward, 2005). However, our results did not yield a link in the group of 6-month-
old infants. Daum et al. (2011) found a link in 6-month-old infants, and a modulating 
influence of action production on action perception has been reported in infants as 
young as 3 months (Needham et al., 2002; Sommerville et al., 2005). These studies 
found an effect on the post hoc evaluation of actions like dishabituation time 
(Sommerville et al., 2005) or total looking time (Daum et al., 2011; Needham et al., 
2002). These measures show that very young infants are able to evaluate the goal-
directedness and rationality of an action after the action is completed. This ability 
does not necessarily depend on infants’ own experience (Csibra, 2008; Gredebäck & 
Melinder, 2010). It is unclear which cognitive processes post hoc measures of action 
perception measure; very different factors like surprise, familiarity, etc. could have 
contributed to previous results. Anticipatory eye movements are a more suitable 
indicator to assess the link between action production and perception, because (1) the 
same underlying mechanism controls eye movements during the production and 
perception of actions (Cannon & Woodward, 2008; Flanagan & Johansson, 2003), 
and (2) anticipatory eye movements are more dependent on behavioural experience 
than post hoc measures (Gredebäck & Melinder, 2010). The present results indicate 
that a common representation of action production and perception that includes 
similar anticipatory demands requires some experience with the task. This is in line 
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with previous findings which suggest a dissociation between post hoc and 
anticipatory measures (Gredebäck & Melinder, 2010). 
The developmental outline of the interplay between production and perception of 
contralateral reaching can be illustrated as follows: At 6 months, infants’ own 
reaching production is limited; contralateral reaching is still at a very early stage of 
development. Although infants are able to anticipate at 6 months, for example a re-
occurring object behind an occluder (Kochukhova & Gredebäck, 2007), or feeding 
actions to the mouth (Kochukhova & Gredebäck, 2010), they rarely anticipate the 
goal of contralateral reaching and transport movements (see also Falck-Ytter et al., 
2006). Furthermore, 6-month-olds’ production and perception behaviour was not yet 
correlated. This means, eye movements do not instantly reflect infants’ behavioural 
skills. We can conclude further that the emerging ability to produce an action does 
not instantly feed a common representation of action production and perception. 
At 12 months, infants’ reaching production has become more sophisticated but is still 
not perfect. At this age, most infants are able to anticipate the goal of observed 
contralateral movements (although, compared to adults, their gaze arrival at goals is 
slower and they show fewer anticipatory eye movements). At 12 months, a link 
between the production and the perception of contralateral movements is established. 
Between 6 and 12 months of age, infants become more experienced in the production 
of reaching per se and of contralateral reaching in particular. It is likely that this 
increase in behavioural experience feeds the common representation of the 
competences. However, they likewise become more experienced in the perception of 
reaching movements. It is possible that experience in observing someone else 
reaching has a similar supportive function as the production of the same movements. 
Further research is needed to clarify this important issue. 
In adults, the ability to anticipate goals of contralateral reaching and transport 
movements has further developed and gaze arrival is more than twice as fast as in 12-
month-olds. We did not test the adults’ ability to reach, however, because our 
paradigm was not suitable for showing differences in reaching production in adults; 
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any link between production and perception of contralateral reaching in adults would 
have been masked by ceiling effects. In adults, this link can be found reliably using 
other paradigms (for an overview, see Prinz et al., 2009). 
Related to the common coding approach (Prinz, 1990, 1997), our findings suggest 
that a common representation of the production and the perception of a developing 
action is not instantaneously present but needs time and experience to develop. 
Whether or not the corresponding mirror-neuron system is present from birth cannot 
be answered with this study. We did not find a link between action production and 
perception at 6 months. This could mean that such a system is not present from birth 
(Del Giudice et al., 2009; Keysers & Perrett, 2004), or that the ‘hardware’ is innate 
(Bertenthal & Longo, 2007; Lepage & Théoret, 2007), but needs to be fed with 
specific actions. 
To conclude, the present findings show that the perception of an action does not 
instantly reflect infants’ own behavioural skills. Given similar anticipatory 
components included in both the action production and perception task, it appears that 
a considerable amount of experience is necessary to establish a common 
representation of action production and perception. 
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Abstract 
Infants and adults frequently observe actions performed jointly by more than one 
person. Research in action perception, however, has focused largely on actions 
performed by an individual person. Here, we explore how infants and adults perceive 
the same action performed by one agent (individual condition) or two agents (joint 
condition). We used eye tracking to measure the latency of participants’ gaze shifts 
towards action goals. Adults anticipated goals in both conditions significantly faster 
than infants, and their gaze latencies did not differ between conditions. By contrast, 
infants showed faster anticipation of goals in the individual condition than in the joint 
condition. This difference was more pronounced in 9-month-olds. These results 
suggest that adults are able to infer the joint goal of two agents, whereas infants might 
represent the respective sub-goals in isolation. 
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1. Introduction 
Practically from birth, infants observe the behaviour of the people around them, and 
they learn to anticipate the goals of others’ actions during their first year of life (e.g., 
Falck-Ytter, Gredebäck, & von Hofsten, 2006). Recently, interest in how infants 
passively perceive others’ interactions emerged, that is, actions performed jointly by 
more than one person (Schmitow & Kochukhova, 2013). It is as yet an unsolved 
question whether the perception of joint action is essentially consistent to individual 
action, or whether they follow different developmental trajectories. The present 
research aimed to investigate this question by presenting infants and adults with a 
block-stacking action that was either performed by one or two agents.  
An important aspect during one’s own performance and the perception of actions is 
the anticipation of the future end state of the action (von Hofsten, 2004). The 
occurrence of anticipatory gaze shifts indicates that an observer has built a 
representation of the observed action goal that allows one to predict the outcome of 
the action before it is completed, and it is typically modulated by infants’ production 
skills with the respective action (e.g., Melzer, Prinz, & Daum, 2012). The anticipation 
of actions has been investigated extensively both in adults (Ambrosini, Sinigaglia, & 
Costantini, 2012; Costantini, Ambrosini, & Sinigaglia, 2012; Elsner, Falck-Ytter, & 
Gredebäck, 2012; Flanagan & Johansson, 2003; Rotman, Troje, Johansson, & 
Flanagan, 2006) and infants (Ambrosini et al., 2013; Daum, Attig, Gunawan, Prinz, & 
Gredebäck, 2012; Falck-Ytter et al., 2006; Henrichs, Elsner, Elsner, & Gredebäck, 
2012; Melzer et al., 2012). In these studies, the perception of individually performed 
manual actions was assessed such as reaching-to-grasp an object (Henrichs et al., 
2012; Melzer et al., 2012), containment of an object (Cannon, Woodward, 
Gredebäck, von Hofsten, & Turek, 2012; Falck-Ytter et al., 2006), or eating 
(Kochukhova & Gredebäck, 2010). Depending on the task, infants start to anticipate 
action goals at around 6 months (Hunnius & Bekkering, 2010; Kanakogi & Itakura, 
2011), and by the end of their first year of life, infants are able to anticipate the goal 
of many manual actions (e.g., Falck-Ytter et al., 2006; Melzer et al., 2012). However, 
in our social world, actions are often performed jointly by more than one person. 
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These joint actions vary from involving two interaction partners (e.g., in a face-to-
face conversation) to a multitude of cooperating or competing interaction partners 
(e.g., in musical or sport performances). Although frequently observed in everyday 
life, little research has addressed the question of how infants and adults perceive these 
interactions.  
1.1. Joint Action in Adults and Infants 
Adults generally coordinate their actions easily to achieve a joint goal such as 
preparing a dinner together (for an overview see, Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 
2006). To do so, adults represent and predict not only their own actions, but also their 
interaction partner’s actions (Kourtis, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2013; Sebanz et al., 
2006). Performance of simple tasks is often improved if another person is present, a 
phenomenon called social facilitation (e.g. Triplett, 1898; Zajonc, 1965), whereas 
more complex tasks can lead to performance impairment (Allport, 1920). Studies on 
task sharing have also demonstrated more specific interferences in situations where 
two adults acted according to complementary task rules (e.g., Atmaca, Sebanz, & 
Knoblich, 2011; Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003). More precisely, when an agent 
represented a task rule of a co-agent that interfered with their own task rule (i.e., 
when they required conflicting actions), response times were larger compared to 
conditions without conflicting task representations. In general, adults are 
exceptionally capable of actively engaging in coordinated joint action. 
Infants participate in parent-child exchanges practically from birth (for an extensive 
overview of the first two years, see Brownell, 2011). During the first months of life, 
these face-to-face interactions become increasingly coordinated with respect to their 
timing and structure (Bigelow & Walden, 2009). Importantly, in early interactions, 
infants are not required to represent the interaction partner’s intentions or goals. In 
the second half of the first year of life, the adult-infant dyads include external objects 
and events, which is referred to as joint attention (Liszkowski, Carpenter, Striano, & 
Tomasello, 2006). Around their first birthday, infants begin to initiate joint action 
(Liszkowski et al., 2006), and between 14 and 18 months children begin to 
1. Introduction 
 
 57 
autonomously engage in coordinated joint action with adults (Bakeman & Adamson, 
1984; Warneken & Tomasello, 2007). Thus, during the first year of life, infants 
participate in joint action, but it is only by the second year of life that they actively 
coordinate their actions with others. 
1.2. Perception of Nonverbal and Verbal Interactions 
Infants do not only engage in joint action with their parents or their siblings. Given 
their limited motor repertoire in the first year of life, they also observe interactions 
between other people without being directly involved, for example their parents 
having a conversation or playing cards. It remains a largely unexplored question how 
infants in their first year of life perceive jointly performed actions, at an age when 
they are not yet able to engage in coordinated joint action themselves. 
In one of the few studies that investigated the perception of a nonverbal interaction, 
6- and 12-month-olds were presented with videos of one agent feeding another 
(Gredebäck & Melinder, 2010). The 12-month-olds anticipated the goal of the 
feeding action (i.e., that the food would be brought to the mouth of the second agent), 
whereas the 6-month-olds did not. By contrast, 6-month-old infants anticipated that 
food would be brought to the mouth if one agent fed herself (Kochukhova & 
Gredebäck, 2010). These studies suggest that 6-month-olds are able to anticipate an 
individually performed feeding action, but not yet an interactively performed one. It 
is important to note, however, that these results have to be compared carefully due to 
different visual and timing aspects. A further aspect that has been investigated is the 
role of infants’ experience when observing manual interaction. Comparable to 
infants’ anticipation of individual actions, their perception of interactions seemed to 
depend on their own active experience with the manual action (Schmitow & 
Kochukhova, 2013). Regarding experience with joint action, it was demonstrated that 
10-month-olds were able to infer the joint goal of two collaborative partners if they 
actively experienced the joint action prior to observing it in a habituation paradigm 
(Henderson, Wang, Matz, & Woodward, 2013). Without this active experience, the 
joint goal could only be inferred by 14-month-olds (Henderson & Woodward, 2011). 
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Furthermore, 18-month-olds inferred a joint goal that two agents performed 
sequentially (Fawcett & Gredebäck, 2013). It is also noteworthy that, in the related 
field of verbal interactions (i.e., conversations between two agents), it was 
demonstrated that even infants anticipated the course of a conversation at least to 
some extent (Keitel, Prinz, Friederici, von Hofsten, & Daum, 2013; von Hofsten, 
Uhlig, Adell, & Kochukhova, 2009). Although the described studies investigated the 
perception of interaction, they do not answer the question of whether the perception 
of joint action is essentially different from individual action in infants and adults. In 
order to do just this, we conducted a study in which we systematically manipulated 
the number of agents involved. 
1.3. The present study 
In the present study, we presented infants and adults with an action that can easily be 
performed by one or two agents and that is familiar to infants: building a tower of 
wooden blocks, or ‘block-stacking’. We tested 9- and 12-month-old infants, when 
practically no coordinated joint action capabilities are present (see, Brownell, 2011), 
and adults who are typically very skilled at coordinating their actions with others 
(e.g., Sebanz et al., 2006). The participants observed videos of a toy tower being built 
by either one agent (individual condition) or alternatingly by two agents (joint 
condition). Both conditions involved identical action goals, and the arrival of 
participants’ gaze shifts at goals was analysed. The presented action involved one 
overarching goal (to build a tower) and a number of sub-goals (to grasp a block; to 
stack it). The overarching goal was identical in both conditions; sub-goals were 
identical concerning their position and sequence, but varied in that they were 
performed by one or two agents. If participants’ perception of the actions is based on 
their representation of the overarching goal, their gaze behaviour should not be 
affected by the number of agents. If, by contrast, participants represent each agent’s 
individual sub-goals in isolation, switching between the goals of the two agents in the 
joint condition could cause differential gaze behaviour of the observer compared to 
the perception of the individual action. 
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2. Method 
2.1. Participants 
The final sample consisted of 23 9-month-old infants (M = 9 months 6 days; range: 
9;2 to 9;12; 12 female), 23 12-month-old infants (M = 12 months 2 days; range: 11;15 
to 12;15; 11 female), and 14 adults (M = 23.4 years; range 21 to 28; 6 female). Seven 
more 9-month-olds and six more 12-month-olds were tested but did not complete 
enough trials to be included in the analyses due to fussiness in one or both conditions. 
One additional adult participant had to be excluded from analyses due to a technical 
error. All infants were born at full term. Infants received a toy for their participation, 
and adults received monetary compensation. The study was approved by a local 
ethics committee and conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. 
2.2. Apparatus and stimuli 
Two videos were recorded, showing how a tower of coloured wooden blocks was 
built by either one agent (individual condition) or two agents (joint condition, see 
Figure 1). In both conditions, the complete tower consisted of six blocks, which were 
placed to the left and right of the base. The agent(s) alternatingly grasped one block at 
a time from the left and from the right and placed it on the base (‘stacking’). Once the 
tower was complete, the blocks were replaced in their initial position in reverse order 
(‘unstacking’). Goals were identical in both conditions. This resulted in a total of 24 
reaching and transport movement sequences (trials) per video during which the 
participants’ gaze behaviour was analysed. To increase the participants’ attention 
towards the stimulus presentation, a ‘swooshing sound’ was presented during the 
transport sequences. During the recording session, a metronome ticked at the rate of 
1 Hz to pace the actors’ movements, and to make the timing in the two conditions as 
similar as possible, Accordingly, the tower was built rhythmically, and each 
movement (reaching for a block; transporting a block) lasted approximately 1 s (see 
Figure 1 for details). The difference in the mean durations of movements between the 
two conditions was minimal (10 ms, i.e., 0.5%). The length of each action sequence 
video was approximately 40 s. Conditions only differed in the number of agents; all 
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other aspects (number and position of blocks, timing of movements, background, 
lighting, etc.) were analogous. 
 
Figure 3.1. Snapshots of individual and joint conditions. The white boxes in the left panel indicate 
AOIs. The average duration (and standard deviation) in the individual condition were M = 970 ms 
(SD = 66 ms) for reaching and M = 987 ms (SD = 62 ms) for transport movements. In the joint 
condition these were M = 990 ms (SD = 39 ms) for reaching and M = 987 ms (SD = 142 ms) for 
transport movements. 
Videos were presented on a 17-inch monitor and subtended a visual angle of 
approximately 28.3° × 19.8°. Gaze was measured using a remote corneal reflection 
eye tracker (Tobii 1750, Stockholm, Sweden; sampling rate: 50 Hz; software: Clear 
View 2.7.1) with an infant add-on (precision: 1°, accuracy: 0.5°). We used a 9-point-
infant calibration. 
2.3. Procedure 
Written informed consent was obtained from the adult participants and from infants’ 
parents prior to testing. After the calibration sequence, which took approximately 30 
s, videos of the two conditions were presented. Order of conditions was 
counterbalanced across participants. Before the start of each video, a salient attention 
grabber was shown (videos of colourful toys that moved and made sounds). The 
presentation of each video was repeated in order to collect more valid trials. The 
stimulus presentation took approximately 3 min. 
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2.4. Data analysis 
Gaze data was analysed using Matlab 7.1 (The MathWorks Inc.). Areas of Interest 
(AOIs) surrounded the positions of the blocks as well as the tower (see white boxes in 
Figure 1). AOIs for the block positions ranged from 4.8° to 5.1° horizontal visual 
angle and covered a vertical visual angle of 2.2°. The tower AOI covered a visual 
angle of 4.7° × 4.9°. 
We computed the arrival of gaze shifts at goal AOIs relative to the arrival of the 
moving hand for each trial. Positive values represented anticipatory gaze shifts 
whereas negative values represented reactive gaze shifts. The time interval for 
anticipatory gaze shifts began with the movement of the hand and ended with the 
arrival of the hand at the goal area. At this point, the time interval for reactive gaze 
shifts began; it ended 1 s after the movement was finished. An individual trial was 
considered to be valid if a gaze shift was preceded by a fixation at the previous AOI 
for at least 100 ms. This ensured that actions were observed attentively. Only 
participants with at least 12 valid trials (6 per condition) where included in final 
analyses. On average, 9-month-olds provided 40.6 (SD = 13.4), 12-month-olds 50.3 
(SD = 21.2), and adult participants 70.6 (SD = 22.2) valid trials. 
3. Results 
Initial analyses did not suggest any evidence for a main effect or interaction effects of 
presentation order (all ps > .32); those data were thus collapsed. Infants’ and adults’ 
gaze behaviour was anticipatory on average in both conditions (see Fig. 2 and Table 
1). Performed t-tests against zero confirmed that participants shifted their gaze to the 
action goals significantly ahead of the agent’s hand (9-month-olds: tindiv(22) = 5.13, 
p < .001, d = 1.07; tjoint(22) = 2.28, p = .03, d = 0.48; 12-month-olds: tindiv(22) = 9.45, 
p < .001, d = 1.97; tjoint(22) = 4.73, p < .001, d = 0.99; adults: tindiv(13) = 28.54, 
p < .001, d = 7.63; tjoint(13) = 27.14, p < .001, d = 7.25).  
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Figure 3.2. Mean gaze arrival at goals for all age groups a) in both conditions, b) for stacking 
direction, and c) movement type (with standard errors). Grey line at zero displays arrival of the hand at 
goal areas. Positive values indicate that gaze was anticipatory. Asterisks denote difference between a) 
individual and joint conditions, b) the two different directions and c) both movement types (**: 
p < .01; *: p < .05; (*): p < .10). 
A 3 × 2 (Age [9 months, 12 months, adults]) × Condition [individual, joint]) Analysis 
of Variance with gaze latency yielded significant main effects of age, 
F(2,57) = 167.89, p < .001, η²G = .80, and condition, F(1,57) = 4.50, p = .04, 
η²G = .004, as well as a marginally significant interaction between both, 
F(2,57) = 2.59, p = .08, η²G = .005 (generalised eta squared values are presented to 
ensure comparability with other studies, see Bakeman, 2005; Olejnik & Algina, 
2000). The main effect of age was caused by significant differences between all age 
groups (all ps < .009, Bonferroni-corrected). Participants anticipated action goals 
faster the older they were. Paired t-tests showed a significant difference between the 
individual and the joint action condition in 9-month-olds, t(22) = 2.40, p = .03, 
d = 0.50, a marginally significant difference in 12-month-olds, t(22) = 2.07, p = .05, 
d = 0.43, and no difference in adults, p > .34. Thus, infants showed faster gaze 
latencies in the condition with one agent, whereas adults anticipated both conditions 
equally fast. This pattern was confirmed non-parametrically: Eighteen 9-month-olds 
showed faster anticipations in the individual condition, compared with only 5 who did 
so in the joint condition, χ2(1) = 7.35, p < .01. Similarly, 15 out of 23 12-month-olds 
anticipated actions faster in the individual condition, χ2(1) = 2.13, p = .14, as did 6 out 
of 14 adults, p = .59. 
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 Individual Joint 
 M SD M SD 
9 Months 115.47 107.85 48.12 101.25 
12 Months 188.88 95.84 139.40 141.45 
Adults 609.99 79.96 629.44 86.78 
Table 3.1. Mean values and standard deviations of gaze latency (in ms) for both conditions for infants 
and adults. 
We further explored how the different types of stacking direction (stacking vs. 
unstacking) and movement (reach vs. transport) affected gaze arrival times. Stacking 
the blocks was anticipated faster than unstacking by all age groups (all ps < .003, 
Figure 2b); and infants, but not adults, anticipated grasping faster than transport 
actions (infants: ps < .05; adults: p = .67, Figure 2c). Further analyses, for example, of 
condition and stacking direction or movement type, were not recommended because 
not all participants delivered data in the corresponding trials, and often only a single 
trial was acquired. These limitations would lead to highly unreliable results. 
4. Discussion 
The aim of the current study was to explore how the perception of individual and 
joint actions develops. Accordingly, we presented infants and adults with the same 
block-stacking action that was performed by either one or two agents. Our main 
findings were that 1) adults anticipated both conditions equally fast, and they 
generally initiated gaze shifts towards action goals very quickly, and 2) infants 
anticipated action goals in the individual condition faster than the joint condition, and 
their gaze shifts towards goals were initiated later than those of adults. One approach 
that possibly explains the present findings is that adults and infants represented the 
observed actions on different hierarchical levels, namely the level of overarching or 
sub-goals (Csibra, 2007). On a higher level, the overarching goal of our agent(s) was 
to alternatingly build a tower from the left and right, and this was identical in both 
conditions. However, if the actions were represented on the lower level of sub-goals, 
a number of differences would arise between conditions. The sub-goals were 
performed by either one agent or two different agents. This resulted in less certainty 
about which agent would act in the joint condition. Furthermore, there was an 
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inevitable increase in visual stimulus complexity in the joint condition because two 
agents filled the scene instead of one. Thus, depending on the level of action 
representation, the conditions were either comparable or quite different. 
4.1. Adults represent joint goals 
The adults in our study did not show differential gaze behaviour towards the action 
goals in the individual and joint condition. This suggests that they inferred the 
overarching goal of the agent(s) to alternatingly build a tower from the left and right, 
and did not represent goals related to the performing agent in the joint condition. This 
higher-level representation could then be used to quickly initiate gaze shifts towards 
sub-goals in a top-down manner in both conditions. Adults usually make use of 
higher-level information, such as goals and intentions, that guide their anticipatory 
gaze shifts (Eshuis, Coventry, & Vulchanova, 2009). Such a higher-level 
representation leads to fast initiation of gaze shifts because the location of the next 
sub-goal can be inferred before the agent has started a movement. It is thus partly 
independent of low-level visual information such as visual stimulus complexity or 
movement kinematics. Such a predominantly top-down processing can explain why 
adults’ anticipatory gaze was initiated very quickly and not affected by the number of 
agents that performed the block-stacking action. 
There is, however, an alternative explanation as to why adults did not show 
differential gaze behaviour in the individual and joint condition. Because the 
observed action was undoubtedly quite simple, adults could have performed at 
ceiling, and this could have covered up underlying differences between conditions. 
We cannot rule out that adults would show delayed initiation of gaze shifts if 
observing a more demanding joint action. This remains subject to further research. 
However, adults are generally able to represent overarching, joint goals (Sebanz et al., 
2006), so that a comparable gaze behaviour towards individual and joint action seems 
possible even in a more demanding task. 
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4.2. Infants represent sub-goals 
The infants in our study anticipated individual action faster than joint action. This 
suggests that they could not make use of a representation of the overarching, joint 
goal in the condition with two agents that could guide their gaze towards sub-goals 
top-down. Instead, infants probably had to infer the sub-goal of each reaching or 
transport movement, while the actions were in progress, based on observable 
information in a bottom-up manner. Infants in their first year of life have been found 
to represent the sub-goals of an action, instead of the overarching goal (Woodward, 
Sommerville, & Guajardo, 2001). Furthermore, if children aged 9 and 12 months 
learned the goal of an animated agent, they subsequently predicted the agent to 
choose a goal based on its previous movement path, whereas children aged 3 years, 
and adults, made predictions based on the agent’s previous goal (Daum et al., 2012). 
Thus, infants seem to rely primarily on low-level visual cues that need to be analysed 
instantaneously, such as a path, or a trajectory (Johnson, Amso, & Slemmer, 2003; 
Meichler & Gratch, 1980; Nelson, 1971, 1974), or the hand aperture in reaching 
actions (Ambrosini et al., 2013; Daum, Vuori, Prinz, & Aschersleben, 2009). This 
would lead to later initiation of gaze shifts in the joint condition for a number of 
reasons. First, switching between the representations of the two agents leads to a 
processing delay that would affect gaze latency (e.g., Altmann, 2011). Second, if no 
overarching goal representation was present, infants could not know which agent 
would act, and this uncertainty would further delay the initiation of gaze shifts. Third, 
the increased stimulus complexity in the joint condition would affect gaze behaviour 
if the action was analysed bottom-up, based on low-level visual information. Taken 
together, the present data suggests that infants’ gaze shifts were guided 
predominantly bottom-up by low-level visual information that allowed them to infer 
the agent(s) sub-goals. This led to a generally later initiation of gaze shifts and a 
differential perception of individual and joint action.  
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4.3. From low-level to higher-level processing 
In the present study, the infant groups anticipated goals in the individual condition 
better than in the joint condition, and this difference was more distinct in the younger 
infant group. As described previously, this suggests that infants probably could not 
make use of a representation of the overarching joint goal of two agents, whereas 
adults could. These findings suggest that the younger the infants, the more they 
depended on observable visual information (e.g., movement kinematics) to infer an 
action goal. This low-level visual information is less important in a top-down 
processing where the goal is inferred before a movement has started. One of the key 
reasons for the development from predominantly low-level to higher-level processing 
is very likely experience with manual actions on the one hand, and joint action on the 
other hand. Such a link between anticipatory gaze shifts and experience has been 
shown in infants (Kanakogi & Itakura, 2011; Melzer et al., 2012; Schmitow & 
Kochukhova, 2013) and adults (e.g., Sailer, Flanagan, & Johansson, 2005). It is likely 
that during their second year of life, children learn to anticipate joint action as well as 
individual action because they become more experienced in coordinating their actions 
with others (Brownell, 2011). This notion is corroborated by findings showing that 
14- and 18-month-olds could infer a joint goal (Fawcett & Gredebäck, 2013; 
Henderson & Woodward, 2011). Due to their extensive active experience, adults are 
able to infer overarching joint goals and are less dependent on low-level visual 
information. It is has been shown, however, that adults still make use of low-level 
information, when a priori predictions are not possible, for example when they 
observe unusual or unpredictable actions (Rotman et al., 2006).  
An interesting detail of our results is that even the 9-month-olds anticipated action 
goals on average. Usually, this gaze behaviour is rarely found in infants below 12 
months of age (but see, Hunnius & Bekkering, 2010; Kanakogi & Itakura, 2011). In 
our study, the rhythmic turn-taking nature of movements could have supported 
infants’ anticipatory gaze shifts (Haith, Hazan, & Goodman, 1988). Notably, this 
supported infants’ anticipation of goals even in the joint condition, although 9-month-
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olds were not yet capable of engaging in joint action themselves (Warneken & 
Tomasello, 2007).  
It is further important to note the bystander nature of the paradigm used in the present 
research. Participants observed the actions passively without being involved. The 
obvious benefit of this approach is that we were able to investigate infants that were 
not yet capable of engaging in joint action themselves. At the same time, infants 
might have been more attentive and motivated to make sense of our block-stacking if 
they had been involved. It is probably also due to this bystander paradigm (and to the 
fact that no conflicting representations were built) that adults did not show an 
interference effect as reported in previous research using paradigms where two agents 
performed a task jointly (Atmaca et al., 2011; Sebanz et al., 2003). 
In another line of results, we found differences between the two directions of stacking 
(stacking vs. unstacking), and the two movement types (reach vs. transport). Stacking 
was anticipated faster by all age groups than unstacking. During stacking, all goals 
where defined by salient goals (i.e., the coloured blocks during reaching, and the 
tower during transport actions). During unstacking, the blocks were replaced in their 
initial location but there was no visible goal for these transport actions, which led to 
later initiation of gaze shifts (Becker & Fuchs, 1969). Furthermore, infants but not 
adults anticipated reaching faster than transport actions. This was probably due to the 
lack of active experience in infants, and the impact of experience on anticipatory gaze 
(e.g., Melzer et al., 2012). The ability to reach emerges at 3 or 4 months of age 
(White, Castle, & Held, 1964), which means that the 9- and 12-month-old infants in 
our study had had some experience with reaching actions. The ability to stack blocks, 
however, develops at around 12 months (e.g., Hayashi & Takeshita, 2009), which 
means that our infants had had little to no experience. This difference in active 
experience between the movement types most likely led to a differential perception of 
reaching and transport actions. Adults had already gained extensive experience in 
reaching and all sorts of manipulative behaviour so they perceived these actions 
similarly.   
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In conclusion, infants in their first year of life perceive individual and joint action 
differently. Infants are probably not yet able to infer the overarching joint goal of two 
agents and have to make use of low-level visual information. Adults, by contrast, 
anticipate individual and joint goals equally fast, because they are able to infer the 
joint goal of two agents. This development from low-level to higher-level processing 
is most likely due to first-hand experience in coordinated joint action. 
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Abstract 
In conversations, adults readily detect and anticipate the end of a speaker’s turn. 
However, little is known about the development of this ability. We addressed two 
important aspects involved in the perception of conversational turn taking: semantic 
content and intonational form. The influence of semantics was investigated by testing 
prelinguistic and linguistic children. The influence of intonation was tested by 
presenting participants with videos of two dyadic conversations: one with normal 
intonation and one with flattened (removed) intonation. Children of four different age 
groups—two prelinguistic groups (6- and 12-month-olds) and two linguistic groups 
(24- and 36-month-olds)—and an adult group participated. Their eye movements 
were recorded, and the frequency of anticipated turns was analyzed. Our results show 
that (a) the anticipation of turns was reliable only in 3-year-olds and adults, with 
younger children shifting their gaze between speakers regardless of the turn taking, 
and (b) only 3-year-olds anticipated turns better if intonation was normal. These 
results indicate that children anticipate turns in conversations in a manner comparable 
(but not identical) to adults only after they have developed a sophisticated 
understanding of language. In contrast to adults, 3-year-olds rely more strongly on 
prosodic information during the perception of conversational turn taking. 
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1. Introduction 
During social interactions, we are confronted with a large amount of verbal and 
nonverbal information. To act and react quickly and appropriately, the incoming flow 
of information needs to be analyzed on-line and upcoming events need to be 
anticipated. This holds especially true for conversations. Here, the principle of taking 
turns is helpful and most fundamental (Sacks, Scheglof, & Jefferson, 1974). In the 
current study, we investigated the development of the ability to anticipate turns 
during the perception of a conversation between two people.  
When engaged in a conversation, it is easy to identify the end of the turn of a 
conversation partner and the beginning of one’s own turn. The end of a speaker’s turn 
is accompanied by a variety of different cues. On the one hand, language 
comprehension (i.e., the semantic content or utterance content) seems to be the most 
important factor for detecting the end of a turn (de Ruiter, Mitterer, & Enfield, 2006; 
Magyari & de Ruiter, 2012). de Ruiter et al. (2006) presented adult participants with 
audio recordings of isolated turns from natural Dutch telephone conversations and 
asked them to press a button when they suspected the turn end. The participants were 
instructed not to wait until the turn was finished but rather to anticipate its ending. 
The results showed that responses were very reliable and that the average response 
time was 200 ms before a turn was finished. This indicated that the participants not 
only were very accurate in detecting the end of turns they were even able to anticipate 
a turn end. Importantly, they were equally able to do so when listening to recordings 
where the intonation had been removed but leaving semantics and syntax intact.  
On the other hand, in natural conversation, a turn end is usually accompanied by a 
number of acoustically marked prosodic boundary cues (Gerken & McGregor, 1998) 
such as intonation, syllable length, and pauses. In general, prosodic boundary cues 
help to segment linguistic units (Gerken & McGregor, 1998), making them an 
important feature in the acquisition of language (Gerken, 1996).  
At the end of conversational turns, the pitch (i.e., intonation) rises or falls, the last 
vowel is lengthened, and pauses are longer compared with the end of clauses or 
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phrases. It has been shown that adults were, in principle, able to use these cues to 
identify a speaker’s turn. When utterances are made unintelligible, with only prosodic 
cues (notably intonation) still intact, participants could identify the end and beginning 
of turns at above chance level (de Ruiter et al., 2006; Schaffer, 1983). But 
performance was better when participants could rely on both prosodic cues and 
utterance content to detect a turn end, compared with a condition where only prosodic 
cues were available (de Ruiter et al., 2006). Although it is unusual in natural 
conversation that only prosodic cues are available (except, e.g., when listening to a 
conversation through a wall or from far away), these experimental studies suggest 
that adults can use prosody to better anticipate the end of a sentence but mainly do so 
once neither semantic nor syntactic information is available (Grosjean & Hirt, 1996).  
Taken together, the results of these studies indicate that adults are able to detect the 
end of a conversational turn even before the previous speaker has finished. If only 
linguistic cues are available, then they do so by focusing predominantly on the 
utterance content. Prosodic cues, such as intonation, primarily have a supportive 
function. 
As children develop, conversations become increasingly important, and the principle 
of taking turns appears to be already relevant at a young age. Infants as young as 3 
months reacted with adapted timing and more speech-like vocalizations if their 
mother (Masataka, 1993) or an experimenter (Bloom, Russell, & Wassenberg, 1987) 
interacted with them in a turn-taking pattern (as opposed to a random, temporally 
noncontingent pattern). Even 2-month-old infants were found to discriminate between 
contingent (turn-taking) and noncontingent interaction with their mothers (Murray & 
Trevarthen, 1985), and they were found to be more interactive and content in the turn-
taking condition. Note, however, that this study has been criticized (Rochat, Neisser, 
& Marian, 1998) and that other studies failed to replicate its results (Muir & Hains, 
1993; Rochat et al., 1998). Up to now, only a few studies have addressed children’s 
perception of turn taking between other people. When watching two people having a 
conversation, infants at 6 months of age and above could follow the conversation 
more easily if speakers were engaged in a face-to-face interaction as opposed to an 
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interaction where the speakers looked in opposite directions, not facing each other 
(Augusti, Melinder, & Gredebäck, 2010). This result suggests that already 
prelinguistic infants are able to perceive (and make use of) relevant aspects of turn 
taking in conversations. von Hofsten, Uhlig, Adell, and Kochukhova (2009) 
presented 1- and 3-year-old children with a performed everyday conversation and 
analyzed how often gaze was shifted to the next speaker before they started speaking. 
Their results showed that the anticipation of turns improved significantly with age, 
from 33.8% in 1-year-olds to 62.2% in 3-year-olds. This study indicates that, at least 
by 3 years of age, children have a general ability to anticipate the next turn in an 
observed conversation. However, so far it has not yet been investigated which 
linguistic factors influence the development of anticipation of turns or, more 
specifically, what role semantic and prosodic cues play in infants’ and toddlers’ 
ability to anticipate turns. As described above, in adults semantics plays the 
predominant role in the perception of turn taking. However, it is unknown which 
factors drive the perception of turn taking earl y in life when little or no semantic and 
syntactic understanding is present. Accordingly, in the following, we briefly review 
the early development of semantic and syntactic understanding.  
Infants start understanding words at around 8 months of age (Fenson et al., 1994; 
Harris, Yeeles, Chasin, & Oakley, 1995). By 16 months, infants comprehend 
approximately 169 words (Fenson et al., 1994). After 16 months, the assessment of 
infants’ rapidly evolving receptive vocabulary is difficult (Harris & Butterworth, 
2002). However, by 30 months, infants’ expressive vocabulary has reached nearly 
600 words (Fenson et al., 1994). Apart from increases in the lexical inventory, 
children between 2 and 3 years of age learn to produce simple and more complex 
sentences (Clark, 2003), which also involves at least some basic knowledge about 
sentence construction (i.e., syntax). A more sophisticated understanding of syntactic 
schemes is not achieved until 3.5 or 4 years of age (Tomasello, 2000). The influence 
of the developing semantic and syntactic understanding abilities on the perception of 
turn taking has yet to be investigated.  
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Concerning the sensitivity to prosody, it has been shown that 6-month-old infants 
already detect syntactic units, such as clauses (Nazzi, Nelson, Jusczyk, & Jusczyk, 
2000; Seidl, 2007) and phrases (Soderstrom, Seidl, Nelson, & Jusczyk, 2003), using 
prosodic cues. In most of these studies, the role of prosodic cues was explored in 
general without focusing on the role of individual cues. However, one prosodic cue, 
namely intonation, is of specific importance for infants; newborns are already able to 
extract intonation in speech (Sambeth, Ruohio, Alku, Fellman, & Huotilainen, 2008; 
Nazzi, Floccia, & Bertoncini, 1998), and infants generally prefer infant-directed 
speech over adult-directed speech (Fernald, 1985). Pronounced intonation has been 
identified as the key reason for this preference in 4-month-olds (Fernald & Kuhl, 
1987). Furthermore, pronounced intonation facilitates the segmentation, and therefore 
the learning of new words, for infants (Thiessen, Hill, & Saffran, 2005). Thus, 
intonation is one of the prosodic cues that plays a special role in infants’ perception of 
spoken language and, consequently, might play an essential role in their anticipation 
of turns. Accordingly, the primary aim of this study was to investigate the influence 
of semantic content and intonational form on the perception of turn taking during 
development. 
The secondary issue approached in the current study was a methodological one. The 
above-mentioned study by von Hofsten et al. (2009) raised one issue. Their findings 
showed that the anticipation of turns improved significantly between 1 and 3 years of 
age. However, the interpretation of these results is difficult because there is no norm, 
baseline, or chance level to which the anticipation frequency can be compared. Thus, 
it is not possible to statistically evaluate the quality of performance. In other words, a 
reliability measure is not available. Accordingly, the second aim of the current study 
was to analyze the gaze data in more detail and to develop a statistical method to 
assess whether the anticipation of turns was reliable or merely a consequence of 
random eye movements.  
Taken together, previous research shows that in perceived conversations, the ability 
to anticipate the onset of turns improves with age (von Hofsten et al., 2009). The 
evolving semantic and syntactic development most likely contributes to the 
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development of the ability to anticipate turns (de Ruiter et al., 2006), which is closely 
linked to the ability to follow the course of a conversation. Furthermore, because 
infants are already able to detect turn ends using prosodic cues (Nazzi et al., 2000; 
Soderstrom et al., 2003), these cues may also support children’s ability to identify and 
anticipate turns in natural dyadic conversations. Here, we investigated whether the 
prosodic cue intonation facilitates children’s anticipation. Additional analyses of gaze 
behavior will provide the possibility of analyzing the reliability of anticipated turns.  
In the current study, we adopted the paradigm used by von Hofsten et al. (2009) to 
evaluate the role of semantics and intonation in children’s ability to anticipate turns in 
observed conversations. Participants were presented with recordings of actors 
performing casual everyday conversations while their gaze was measured. The 
influence of semantics was investigated by testing different age groups: two 
prelinguistic groups (6- and 12-month-olds), two linguistic groups (24- and 36-
month-olds), and a control group of adults. The role of intonation was tested by 
presenting the participants in each group with two conversations: one with normal 
intonation and one with flattened intonation. We expected to find developmental 
differences between younger and older children with respect to intonation. On the one 
hand, it seems plausible that prelinguistic infants might be more sensitive to 
intonation cues than older children because this facilitates early speech processing 
and word learning. On the other hand, if children’s use of intonational cues depends 
on the development of the respective communicative functions, then intonation might 
be more helpful for older linguistic children because conversations play a more 
important part in their lives. Furthermore, we refined the analysis of participants’ 
gaze behavior during the conversations. We analyzed not only how often the onset of 
a turn was anticipated but also how often gaze shifts were unrelated to turns or 
random. With this procedure, we intended to obtain a more detailed picture of the 
development of the ability to anticipate conversational turns. We expected a reliable 
anticipation of turns only in older children and adults because a sophisticated 
understanding of the utterance content seems to be the most important ability for the 
anticipation of turns (de Ruiter et al., 2006; Magyari & de Ruiter, 2012). 
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In a first step, a pilot study was conducted with 82 children from 6 to 36 months of 
age. This study revealed that only the 3-year-olds anticipated more turns in the 
condition with normal, as opposed to flattened, intonation.
1
 However, the actors in 
the conversation were not trained and spoke rather artificially. Furthermore, actors 
moved a lot while talking, which could serve as an additional cue to turn taking. 
Hence, to analyze this interesting effect in more detail, we recorded new stimulus 
material with trained actors (see Method) who could provide ecologically valid 
conversations (e.g., reasonably natural speech) while not overly moving.  
2. Method  
2.1. Participants  
A total of 120 participants, 24 in each of the five age groups, completed the study and 
were included in the final analyses: 6-month-olds (10 female and 14 male, mean 
age  = 6 months 2 days, range = 5 months 25 days to 6 months 13 days), 12-month-
olds (12 female and 12 male, mean age = 12 months 8 days, range = 11 months 21 
days to 12 months 19 days), 24-month-olds (7 female and 17 male, mean age = 24 
months 17 days, range = 24 months 9 days to 24 months 25 days), 36- month-olds (14 
female and 10 male, mean age = 36 months 16 days, range = 36 months 0 days to 37 
months 0 days), and adults (13 female and 11 male, mean age = 25 years, range = 20–
32 years). An additional 12 6-month-olds, 13 12-month-olds, 13 24-month-olds, and 
6 36-month-olds were tested but excluded from data analysis because they did not 
watch one or both of the conversations attentively. Contact information of children 
was obtained from public birth records. Families received a small gift for their 
participation. The study was approved by a local ethics committee and conducted in 
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.  
                                                 
1
 In total, 22 6-month-olds, 21 12-month-olds, 23 24-months-olds, and 16 36-month-olds completed 
the pilot study. An additional 22 children were tested but not included in the final analyses due to 
fussiness. A 4 (Age: 6, 12, 24, or 36 months) × 2 (Intonation: normal or flattened) analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) revealed that children anticipated more turns the older they were (F = 12.14, p < .001, 
η2p = .32) and no other effects. Paired t tests showed that only 36-month-olds anticipated more turns in 
the normal condition, t(15) = 2.77, p = .014, d = 0.69. Children in younger age groups did not show a 
difference between normal and flattened conversations (all ps > .24). 
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2.2. Apparatus and stimuli 
Two German conversations were video-recorded with four female actors recruited 
from an acting school. They were instructed to move their heads and bodies as little 
as possible, to keep their voices natural, and to speak in an adult-directed manner. 
The actors sat on chairs facing each other. At the beginning of each video, one actor 
was present and said ‘‘Hello’’ into the camera to greet the participants. The second 
actor then entered, sat down, and also greeted the participants before starting the 
conversation with the first actor. Contents of the conversations were everyday topics 
such as leisure activities (Conversation A) and holiday preparations (Conversation B). 
Each conversation consisted of 29 turns (i.e., 28 turn taking) between actors that were 
analyzed (greeting of the children at the beginning was excluded). The actors’ rate of 
speaking was moderate (see Table 4.1 for details). Conversations were designed to 
have similar properties. For example, the number of questions was equal for each 
speaker and, accordingly, for each conversation. The conversations did not contain 
‘‘continuers’’ (Schegloff, 1982) or ‘‘back-channels’’ (Yngve, 1970) between turns, 
such as ‘‘m-hm.’’ Furthermore, both conversations were of similar length. The 
duration of speech (and pauses) between the two conversations differed by only 
approximately 11% (8%), and this difference in duration means was smaller than 
20% (16%) of 1 standard deviation. Conversations were recorded with a directed 
microphone (SennheiserK6/ME66). 
 
Number of Length (s) Ø Words / Turn 
Turn-Taking Total Ø Speech Ø Pauses 
Conversation A 28 100.76 2.26 0.93 6.6 
Conversation B 28 105.36 2.52 0.86 6.9 
 Normal Intonation Flattened Intonation  
 M (Hz) SD (Hz) M (Hz) SD (Hz)  
Conversation A 198.87 47.28 198.71 0.63  
Conversation B 190.41 50.67 190.54 1.02  
Table 4.1. Details of the two conversations. Upper panel: number of turn-taking; total length of 
conversations, mean length of speech (i.e. turns) and pauses between turns; mean number of words per 
turn. Lower panel: mean and standard deviation of pitch for normal and flattened conditions. 
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The conversations were presented with either normal or flattened intonation. For the 
flattened intonation conversations, the variations of the fundamental frequency (F0) 
were removed and averaged to the mean frequency of the conversations using the 
software Praat (Boersma &Weenink, 2010). Specifically, the pitch contour of the 
conversations was extracted and segmented into pitch points at a rate of 100 Hz. The 
pitch points were removed, and a new pitch contour was created with the average 
frequency of the respective conversation using PSOLA (pitch synchronous overlap 
and add) resynthesis. This resulted in clearly less intonated monotone speech (see 
lower panel of Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1).  
 
Figure 4.1. Pitch contour of both conversations in the normal and flattened conditions. 
The videos were presented on a 17″- monitor (resolution: 800 × 600 pixels), and gaze 
was measured using a remote corneal reflection eye tracker (Tobii 1750, Stockholm, 
Sweden; ClearView 2.7.1 software; sampling rate: 50 Hz) with an infant add-on 
(precision: 1°; accuracy: 0.5°). The participants sat at a distance of approximately 
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60 cm from the monitor. Videos subtended a visual angle of 27.5° × 15.2°. A 9-point 
infant calibration was used. 
2.3. Procedure 
The experimenter explained the procedure and method to infants’ parents and 
obtained their informed consent. The exact purpose of the study was disclosed after 
testing so as not to influence participants’ and parents’ behavior. All infants were 
tested individually with one parent present. After the calibration sequence, 
participants watched two conversations: A and B. One of the conversations was 
shown with normal intonation and one with flattened intonation. The order of 
conversations and the intonation of each conversation were counterbalanced across 
participants. Before the start of each conversation, a salient attention grabber (videos 
of toys that moved and made noises, e.g., a spinning and laughing starfish) was 
presented to focus the participant’s attention on the monitor. The calibration 
procedure took approximately 1 min, and presentation of the videos took 
approximately 4 min.  
2.4. Data analysis 
Eye movements were analyzed using Matlab 7.1 (MathWorks). For all analyses, only 
gaze shifts toward the areas of interest (AOIs) were included. AOIs surrounded the 
faces from the top of the head to the chin and from the tip of the nose to the rear of 
the ear (see boxes in Figure 4.2). AOIs ranged from 3.3° to 4.2° horizontal visual 
angle and from 5.5° to 6.2° vertical visual angle.  
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Figure 4.2. Illustration of the time intervals and direction of anticipatory and reactive gaze shifts (A) 
and of random gaze shifts (B). Areas of interest (AOIs) are indicated by white boxes around faces in 
the left pictures.  
First, gaze shifts related to turns were identified as anticipatory or reactive in order to 
calculate the relative frequency of anticipated turns. This measure was used by von 
Hofsten et al. (2009), as well as in a number of other action perception studies 
(Daum, Attig, Gunawan, Prinz, & Gredebäck, 2012; Johnson, Amso, & Slemmer, 
2003; Melzer, Prinz, & Daum, 2012), and represents an intuitive and simple 
indication of participants’ performance. The number of anticipated turns was divided 
by the total number of attentively watched turns: 
                                     
                  
            
 
To be classified as an anticipatory gaze shift, a gaze needed to be shifted from the 
current speaker to the next speaker before she had begun to speak (see Figure 4.2 A). 
The respective time interval began 500 ms prior to the end of the current speaker’s 
turn, included the pause between turns, and ended with the start of the next speaker’s 
turn. The 500-ms interval prior to the pause ensured that a gaze shift was classified as 
anticipatory even if participants shifted their gaze to the next speaker while the 
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current speaker had not yet finished. This takes into account that adults are able to 
anticipate the end of the current speaker’s turn as opposed to responding to a 
perceived turn end (de Ruiter et al., 2006). Gaze shifts were classified as reactive if 
the gaze was shifted to the next speaker after she had begun to speak. Gaze shifts 
were included in the analysis only where participants had looked at the current 
speaker for at least 100 ms before shifting gaze to the next speaker. This ensured that 
turns were watched attentively and that gaze shifts were related to a turn in the 
conversation. In some cases, children did not notice a change of speaker and did not 
shift the gaze to the next speaker during her turn but kept fixating on the nonspeaker 
until it was her turn again. Such gaze behavior was not dismissed but rather was 
included in the number of turns in which infants watched the conversation attentively 
in order to calculate the relative frequency of anticipated turns.  
Second, gaze behavior was analyzed in more detail. The previous analysis of 
anticipatory gaze shifts focused on gaze shifts that were most likely related to a 
change of speaker. However, during conversations, in addition to turn-related gaze 
shifts, turn-unrelated or random gaze shifts occur. These random gaze shifts between 
speakers can distort the frequency of anticipated turns. To account for this, we 
calculated the occurrence rate of anticipatory and random gaze shifts. For these 
indexes, the total number of anticipatory or random gaze shifts was divided by the 
respective time interval during which such a gaze shift could theoretically occur: 
                            
            
 
 
Anticipatory gaze shifts were identified using the same criteria as in the previous 
analysis of their relative frequency. Gaze shifts were classified as random if the gaze 
was shifted from the current speaker to the nonspeaker (excluding a 500-ms interval 
prior to a pause; see Figure 4.2 B for an overview and specifications of the exact time 
intervals and direction of anticipatory and random gaze shifts). The sum of the 
anticipatory and random gaze shifts was then divided by the total duration that a 
participant had fixated on both of the speakers’ faces in the respective time intervals 
(in general, these were pauses for anticipatory gaze shifts, and speech for random 
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gaze shifts, apart from the 500-ms intervals prior to a pause during which an 
anticipatory gaze shift could occur as well). These durations represent the time during 
which the conversation was watched attentively. 
Occurrence rates can be regarded as a probability to make a gaze shift during the 
respective time intervals. Their analysis enables a direct comparison of the occurrence 
of anticipatory and random gaze shifts. If the occurrence rate of anticipatory gaze 
shifts were statistically larger than the occurrence rate of random gaze shifts, then we 
could infer reliable anticipation of turns in conversations. In other words, this analysis 
examines whether or not turn-related gaze shifts are significantly different from 
chance level. This allows for conclusions about how well an observer can anticipate 
the course of a conversation. 
In addition, the occurrence rates allow for a more detailed assessment of the influence 
of intonation on the perception of conversational turn taking. If the occurrence rate of 
anticipatory gaze shifts were decreased in the condition with flattened intonation, 
then intonation would have a supportive influence on the perception of turn taking in 
conversations. If, however, the occurrence rate of random gaze shifts were increased 
in the condition with flattened intonation, then participants were likely to be 
distracted by the missing intonation. Therefore, this analysis provides an important 
control of undesirable effects. 
Participants were included in further analyses when they attentively followed at least 
four turns (14%) in each conversation (see calculation of anticipation frequency 
above for criteria of ‘‘attentively followed turns’’). On average, participants in the 
different age groups attended to 38% (6-month-olds), 40% (12-month-olds), 41% 
(24-month-olds), 57% (36-month-olds), and 94% (adults) of turns. Bonferroni-
corrected t tests (all tests reported are two-tailed) showed that 36-month-olds attended 
to significantly more turns than the younger age groups (all ps < .01) and adults 
differed from all child age groups (all ps < .001). There was no difference among 6- 
to 24-month-olds. At 3 years of age, children are more interested in conversations 
than younger children and show some basic communication skills themselves (Nadel, 
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Guerini, Peze, & Rivet, 1999). Greater interest and attention span, as well as 
advanced semantics, can explain the higher number of attended trials in older children 
and adults. 
3. Results 
3.1. Relative frequency of anticipated turns 
Initial analyses did not reveal any effect of the order of presentation. Consequently, 
those data were collapsed for further analyses. Figure 4.3 and Table 4.2 show the 
relative frequency of anticipated turns, as indicated by gaze shifts in intonationally 
normal and flattened conditions for each age group. The distribution of anticipatory 
gaze shifts during the 500-ms interval before the pause and during the pause is 
illustrated in Figure 4.4. The histograms show that a considerable amount of 
anticipatory gaze shifts was performed while a speaker was still speaking, in line with 
previous findings (de Ruiter et al., 2006).  
 
Figure 4.3. Relative frequency of anticipated turns, as indicated by gaze shift in both conversations for 
all age groups (with standard errors). An asterisk indicates a significant difference between normal and 
flattened conditions (*p < .05). 
A 4 (Age: 6, 12, 24, or 36 months) × 2 (Intonation: normal or flattened) analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) was conducted with relative frequency of anticipations as the 
dependent variable. The adult sample served as a control group, reflecting the 
‘‘developmental end state’’ of the perception of conversations; therefore, the adult 
data were only informative and not included in the ANOVAs. The main effect of age 
IV. PERCEPTION OF CONVERSATIONS 
 
 
 90 
in the four groups of children reached significance, F(3,92) = 6.48, p = .001, 
η2p = .17. In general, participants anticipated more turns the older they were.  
Age Group 6 Months 12 Months 24 Months 36 Months Adults 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Normal Intonation (%) 30.8 22.1 42.5 21.2 45.2 20.3 58.3 14.6 54.4 19.2 
Flattened Intonation (%) 35.6 22.0 44.3 18.3 48.9 18.5 49.0 18.6 54.8 16.2 
Anticipatory Gaze Shifts 0.23 0.13 0.32 0.11 0.34 0.15 0.42 0.18 0.42 0.15 
Random Gaze Shifts 0.24 0.12 0.36 0.14 0.32 0.09 0.31 0.10 0.26 0.06 
Table 4.2. Mean frequency of anticipated turns (in %) in the normal and flattened conditions, and mean 
occurrence rates for anticipatory and random gaze shifts (both with standard deviations and for all age 
groups). 
Bonferroni-corrected post hoc t tests yielded significant differences between 6-
month-olds and 24-month-olds and between 6-month-olds and 36-month-olds (both 
ps < .03). Differences between the other groups of children were not significant (all 
ps > .20). There was no main effect of intonation, F(1,92) < 1, but the interaction 
between age and intonation approached significance, F(3,92) = 2.24, p = .09, 
η2p = .07. 
Paired t tests indicated a difference between normal and flattened intonation 
conditions only in 36-month-olds, t(23) = 2.66, p = .014, d = 0.54. Of the 24 children 
in this age group, 17 anticipated more turns when intonation was normal, 
χ2(1) = 5.26, p = .02 (1 child showed no difference between normal and flattened 
conditions). In all other age groups, including the adults, there was no difference 
between conditions (all ps > .30). 
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Figure 4.4. Histograms of anticipatory gaze shifts (absolute values) during the 500-ms interval prior to 
a pause (light gray bars) and during a pause (dark gray bars) for both conditions and all age groups. 
Bin size is 250ms. Note that reactive gaze shifts are not included. 
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3.2. Occurrence rates of anticipatory and random gaze shifts 
The values of the occurrence rates of anticipatory and random gaze shifts were 
averaged over both conversations (see lower part of Table 4.2). A 4 (Age: 6, 12, 24, 
or 36 months) × 2 (Occurrence Rate: anticipatory or random) ANOVA yielded a 
significant main effect of age, F(3,92) = 7.77, p < .001, η2p = .20, and a significant 
Age × Occurrence Rate interaction, F(3,92) = 3.35, p = .02, η2p = .099. There was no 
main effect of occurrence rate (F = 1.39, p = .24). The significant interaction can be 
explained by paired t tests for each age group. As illustrated in Figure 4.5, children 
from 6 to 24 months of age showed anticipatory gaze shifts as often as random gaze 
shifts during the time they watched the conversations attentively (all ps > .14). The 
36-month-olds showed more anticipatory gaze shifts than random gaze shifts, 
t(23) = 2.13, p < .05, d = 0.43. For the adult group, this difference was even larger, 
t(23) = 4.28, p < .001, d = 0.88. 
 
Figure 4.5. Occurrence rates of anticipatory and random gaze shifts for all age groups averaged over 
both conditions (with standard errors). Asterisks indicate a significant difference between the 
occurrence rates of anticipatory and random gaze shifts (*p < 05; **p < .01). 
In addition, we evaluated the effect of intonation on the occurrence rates of 
anticipatory and random gaze shifts. In line with results of the relative frequencies, 
anticipatory gaze shifts occurred more often in the conversations with normal 
intonation only in 36-month-olds, t(23) = 2.63, p = .02, d = 0.54. All other age groups 
showed no difference between normal and flattened conditions (all ps > .12).  
Importantly, the occurrence rate of random gaze shifts did not differ between normal 
and flattened conditions (in 36-month-olds: p = .46; in all other age groups: ps > .10), 
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indicating that children did not generally make more or fewer gaze shifts in one of the 
conditions. 
4. Discussion 
The aim of the current study was to investigate the development of the ability to 
anticipate turns in conversations. The influence of semantics was evaluated by 
studying prelinguistic and linguistic children and adults. The importance of the 
prosodic feature intonation and its role in anticipating turns was investigated by 
varying the presence and absence of intonation in the conversations. We presented 
videos of dyadic conversations with normal and flattened intonation and recorded 
participants’ eye movements. The combined analyses of the relative frequency of 
anticipated turns and of the occurrence rate of random and anticipatory gaze shifts 
allowed for a statistical analysis of infants’ gaze behavior, providing information on 
the quality of the anticipation of turns. The main findings can be summarized as 
follows. First, the main study and the pilot study both provided converging evidence 
that intonation influenced the perception of conversations only in 3-year-olds. 
Second, the anticipation of turns was reliable only from 3 years of age onward. 
4.1. Intonation and perception of turn taking 
Intonation did not have a measurable effect on the anticipation of conversational turn 
taking by infants from 6 to 24 months of age. This is interesting given that 
intonational differences are already processed by newborns (Nazzi et al., 1998; 
Sambeth et al., 2008) and intonation plays an important role in early word learning 
(Thiessen et al., 2005). There are two possible explanations for the lack of an effect 
that are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The first explanation concerns infants’ 
general ability to anticipate turns in observed conversations, which might be limited 
primarily due to semantic limitations. Previous studies have reported a predominant 
influence of semantic skills on the anticipation of turns in adults (de Ruiter et al., 
2006; Magyari & de Ruiter, 2012). The semantic and syntactic understanding of the 
young children in our study might have been too rudimentary to reveal intonation 
effects. In addition, limited attentional capacities could have impaired the ability to 
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use intonational cues and/or anticipate turns. For example, it might have been more 
difficult for infants to integrate the high amount of verbal and visual information. 
Hence, a potential effect of intonation could have been covered up by infants’ general 
inability to follow the conversation. This line of explanation gains some support from 
our result that young children under 3 years did not yet show a reliable anticipation of 
turns. We discuss the reliability aspect below. 
The second explanation as to why young children did not show a difference between 
intonationally normal and flattened conditions is related to the specific function of the 
intonational cues. Electrophysiological evidence suggests that the processing of 
prosodic boundary cues, including intonation, differs fundamentally between older 
and younger children (Männel & Friederici, 2009, 2010). Similar to adults, older 
children from 3 years onward demonstrate a brain response indexing the recognition 
of the linguistic function of prosodic boundary cues in sentences that is independent 
of the acoustically salient pause. Younger children are not able to process the 
linguistic function of the intonational cues. Instead, they need the pause for boundary 
detection and show obligatory electrophysiological responses that indicate low-level 
acoustic processes (Männel & Friederici, 2009, 2010). Thus, although younger 
children process intonation on a general level (Sambeth et al., 2008), they do not have 
the ability to use it in its function as an indicator of the end of a phrase in a sentence 
(Männel & Friederici, 2009, 2010) or the end of turns in conversations (current data). 
Only 36-month-olds benefited from the additional information provided by the 
presence of intonation as one important prosodic feature. They showed more 
anticipatory eye movements, and thus better anticipation of the next turn, when 
intonation was present. This was not due to a generally higher occurrence of gaze 
shifts during the conversation (which could have implied that participants were 
distracted by the missing intonation) but rather was caused by a higher occurrence of 
anticipatory gaze shifts when intonation was present compared with when it was not. 
This is in line with the finding that children at 3 years of age have learned to use 
prosodic boundary cues to indicate higher level linguistic aspects, as implicated by 
recent electrophysiological data on sentence processing (Männel & Friederici, 2010). 
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However, their language abilities are not yet as sophisticated as those of adults, which 
may explain why at this point in development the additional information provided by  
intonation effectively supports the perception of conversations and the anticipation of  
a speaker’s next turn. 
In adults, intonational cues do not affect the anticipation of turns in conversations. 
Adults rely mainly on other cues to predict speakers’ turns, most likely related to a 
sophisticated, lexico-syntactic driven understanding of language (de Ruiter et al., 
2006; Magyari & de Ruiter, 2012). This result is in line with the notion that adults use 
prosody more efficiently to predict the end of a sentence (or a turn) if semantic and 
syntactic information is lacking (Grosjean & Hirt, 1996). 
4.2. Reliability of perception of turn taking 
Regarding the question of how well turns in conversations can be anticipated, the 
relative frequency of anticipated turns only allows the conclusion that there is an 
increase with age, replicating previous findings (von Hofsten et al., 2009). This 
increase is very likely the result of a better comprehension of language with age 
because semantics and syntax are major factors in predicting the end of a turn (de 
Ruiter et al., 2006; Grosjean & Hirt, 1996; Magyari & de Ruiter, 2012). The 
conducted analyses of the occurrence rates of anticipatory and random gaze shifts 
refine and extend these results with respect to a crucial aspect, namely, the reliability 
of turn-taking-related gaze shifts. Children from 6 to 24 months of age made 
anticipatory (turn-related) or random (turn-unrelated) gaze shifts equally often. This 
means that the young children shifted their gaze between the two speakers regardless 
of their turn taking and, therefore, did not show the ability to anticipate the course of 
the conversations reliably. 
Only from 36 months of age onward did anticipatory gaze shifts occur more often 
than random gaze shifts. Accordingly, reliable anticipation of turns (and therefore the 
ability to anticipate the course of conversations) is present only by 3 years of age. 
These analyses reveal that there is no fundamental difference in the quality of gaze 
shifts between prelinguistic (6- and 12-month-old) and linguistic (24- and 36-month-
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old) children, but there is a change in gaze behavior from 2 to 3 years of age. By 3 
years, gaze shifts are qualitatively related to turn taking. It is at this age that children 
can produce complex sentences (Clark, 2003; Fenson et al., 1994) and master basic 
verbal communication skills (Nadel & Fontaine, 1989). They become more engaged 
in adult-like dyadic conversations and start using communicative strategies (Haslett 
& Samter, 1997). In addition to advanced semantic and syntactic development, it is 
possible that only from 3 years of age onward can children comprehend the principle 
of taking turns and apply it to perceived conversations. However, it has been shown 
that 3-month-olds can interact nonverbally in turns (Bloom et al., 1987), which is 
sometimes regarded as a precursor to more complex forms of verbal communication 
exchanges (Billard, 2002; Nadel et al., 1999). More research is required to fully 
understand all of the factors relevant in the development of the ability to anticipate 
the course of an observed verbal conversation. 
A further interesting and not necessarily expected result of the current study is that 
the adult participants anticipated only little more than half of the observed turns. 
Moreover, their anticipation frequency did not differ from that of the 3-year-olds. In 
this case, the occurrence rates of random and anticipatory gaze shifts are particularly 
valuable as a reliability measure and can help to assess the adults’ performance. 
Adults showed a comparable occurrence rate of anticipatory gaze shifts to the 3-year-
olds. At the same time, they made much fewer random gaze shifts, resulting in a 
bigger difference between the two occurrence rates. Hence, adults showed 
considerably more anticipatory gaze shifts than random gaze shifts (p < .001) and a 
very reliable skilled anticipation of the course of the conversations.  
The simple and straightforward design of the current study provides a first step to 
study children’s perception of everyday conversations and their use of linguistic cues 
such as intonation when anticipating conversational turns. In the same way as it 
provides initial insight into the processing of observed conversations, it opens a 
variety of new questions. The most obvious question is when an adult-like perception 
of conversations is achieved. Other open questions are whether infant-directed speech 
facilitates young children’s anticipation of turns and to what extent natural variations 
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in pitch at the end of turns can be related to gaze shifts. Furthermore, the relationship 
between anticipatory gaze shifts and children’s semantic skills has yet to be proven 
experimentally and could be achieved by correlating children’s language skills to 
anticipatory gaze shifts. In addition, the relationship between gaze shifts and general 
cognitive skills, such as children’s attention capacity, could provide further 
indications about underlying mechanisms. 
For the current study, it is important to point out that participants were passive 
bystanders and not actively involved in the conversations. It is possible that 
sensitivity to turn-taking cues was reduced compared with interactions where one is 
required to react. Another factor that might have limited especially the children’s 
performance is the adult nature of conversational topics and demeanor. However, it is 
important to note that the conversations represented normal speech and pause 
duration between adults as they are regularly observed by adults as well as children. 
For example, the pauses in our study were approximately 900 ms on average; a mean 
pause duration shorter than 500 ms is not unusual in normal adult conversation (see, 
e.g., Heldner & Edlund, 2010). The average speaking rate (in English) is 4 to 7 
syllables per second (Huggins, 1967). In our conversations, the average speaking rate 
was at the lower end of this range (4.3 syllables/s). Furthermore, the duration of turns 
in our study ranged from 320 ms (for ‘‘Bye’’ at the end of the conversation) to 
5760 ms. Even the shortest duration of speech does not pose any challenges to the 
human auditory system to extract the pitch and compare it with previous values. 
Assuming a female voice with an average fundamental frequency of 200 Hz (as in our 
conversations), adults can theoretically detect and compare the pitch of a vowel as 
short as 20 to 25 ms (Lee, 1994; Lee & Bacon, 1997). Even the auditory system of 
newborn infants is already able to detect the pitch contour of words (Nazzi et al., 
1998), and the fact that newborns and infants are able to detect a rapid change of 
pitch similarly to adults is vastly documented by psychophysiological studies (e.g., 
Alho, Sainio, Sajaniemi, Reinikainen, & Näätänen, 1990; Carral et al., 2005; Haden 
et al., 2009; Stefanics et al., 2009). Furthermore, although our results suggest that the 
ability to anticipate conversational turns is related to language comprehension and 
production (because only 3- year-olds and adults anticipated turns reliably), this also 
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poses a limitation on the interpretation of the young children’s results; because 6- to 
24-month-olds shifted their gaze between speakers independently of their turn taking, 
their data need to be interpreted carefully. 
In conclusion, the current study shows that, even though language evolves rapidly 
during the first years of life, it is only by 3 years that children develop the ability to 
reliably anticipate turns in an observed conversation between adults. Furthermore, the 
results indicate that intonation is of particular importance for 3-year-olds in order to 
anticipate the course of such observed conversations. Thus, children seem to use the 
prosodic information to a greater extent to anticipate conversational turns when their 
language comprehension is well developed but still not as sophisticated as that of 
adults. 
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The perception of an action and its production are inextricably linked. This entails 
that, during development, the skills that children are able to perform influence their 
perception of other’s actions. The present dissertation aimed to investigate the role of 
children’s experience on the perception of actions in three distinctive areas: manual 
actions performed by one person (individual action), manual actions performed by 
two people (joint action), and a conversation between two people. In order to succeed 
in each of the three areas, children have to acquire new skills and do so successively 
during their first three years of life. The methodological approach of this work was to 
measure the gaze behaviour of children, aged 6 months to 3 years, and adults during 
the observation of visually presented actions, which provided information on whether 
they were able to anticipate action goals. 
The findings obtained generally show an influence of experience on the anticipation 
of action goals in each of the three areas. First, a link between action and perception 
is not established as soon as an action emerges. There is at least some experience 
necessary for its development. Second, infants with no coordinated joint-action skills 
themselves anticipate the goals of joint action less well than those of individual 
action. Adults with considerable joint-action skills anticipate both equally well. And 
third, the course of a conversation can only be reliably anticipated by children aged 3 
years and adults, whereas younger children shift their gaze between speakers 
randomly. Furthermore, only at the age of 3 years, did intonation support children’s 
anticipation of conversations. 
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Summary 
Introduction 
The production of an action and its perception are inextricably linked (for an 
overview, see Prinz, Aschersleben, & Koch, 2009). More precisely, there is a 
common representational domain between planned and observed actions (Prinz, 1990, 
1997; Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001). This entails that, during 
development, the skills that children learn to perform influence their perception of 
other’s actions (e.g., Cannon, Woodward, Gredebäck, von Hofsten, & Turek, 2012; 
Kanakogi & Itakura, 2011). Generally, actions can be performed by one person, such 
as simply grasping a cup of coffee (‘nonverbal individual action’), but they can also 
be performed jointly by more people, such as two people preparing a dinner together 
(‘nonverbal joint action’), or having a conversation (‘verbal joint action’). In order to 
succeed in the performance of those nonverbal and verbal actions and interactions, 
children have to obtain different skills: Infants learn to perform various manual 
actions during their first year of life (e.g., Bourgeois, Khawar, Neal, & Lockman, 
2005). During their second year of life, they learn to coordinate those individual 
actions with others in joint action (Brownell, 2011). During their third year of life, 
children master to verbally interact with others (Clark, 2003). Thus, each of the 
actions in the different areas requires new skills that are learned successively during 
the first 3 years of life.  
Summary of the Dissertation 
The present dissertation aimed to investigate how the increasing experience in 
performing nonverbal and verbal actions and interactions influences children’s and 
adults’ perception of others’ actions in the respective areas. To this end, we visually 
presented participants of different age groups with actions and measured their gaze. 
The way that participants shift their gaze towards action goals (nonverbal actions) or 
between speakers of a conversation (verbal interaction) reveals whether they are able 
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to anticipate goals, or the course of a conversation, respectively. The occurrence of 
anticipatory gaze shifts indicates that an observer has built a representation of the 
observed action goal that allows one to predict the outcome of the action before it is 
completed. For example, infants have been shown to anticipate the goals of many 
manual actions by 12 months of age (e.g., Cannon, et al., 2012; Falck-Ytter, 
Gredebäck, & von Hofsten, 2006). This ability is typically modulated by their own 
experience with the respective action (e.g., Gredebäck & Melinder, 2010). 
The dissertation comprises three studies, addressing a nonverbal manual action 
performed by one individual (study one), a nonverbal manual action performed by 
two people (study two), and a visually presented conversation between two people 
(study three). In each study, different age groups were tested to assess the role of 
increasing experience on the anticipation of action goals. 
Study 1: Common representation of individual action  
The first study addressed the question whether a link (i.e., a common representation) 
between the perception and the production of individual action is established as soon 
as an action emerges during development, or whether more active experience is 
necessary for its formation. To this end, 6- and 12-month-old infants were presented 
with videos of contralateral manual actions (e.g., reaching across the body midline) 
and their gaze shifts towards action goals were measured. Additionally, infants’ own 
contralateral reaching skills were tested using a task adopted from Bruner (1969). 
Contralateral reaching emerges in the middle of the first year of life and slowly 
improves over the next months. It is thus particularly useful to determine when a 
common representation between perception and action is established. The results 
showed that, as expected, the 12-month-olds performed contralateral reaching actions 
more often than the 6-month-olds. Furthermore, the 12-month-olds showed 
anticipatory gaze shifts towards action goals, whereas the 6-month-olds showed 
reactive gaze shifts (i.e., their gaze arrived at the goal after the action was completed). 
And, most importantly, a correlation between the two tasks was only present in 12-
month-olds, but not yet in 6-month-olds. These results suggest that a common 
representation between action perception and production during development is not 
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instantly present. Instead, the formation of such a link seems to depend on a certain 
amount of active experience, or ‘training’ in performing an action. 
Study 2: The difference between individual and joint action in development 
The second study concerned the perception of joint action. Children learn to 
coordinate their actions with others during the second year of life (Brownell, 2011). 
However, they passively observe others’ joint action from very early on. It is yet an 
unsolved question whether infants’ perception of joint action is essentially different 
from individual action, or whether both follow the same developmental trajectory. 
We addressed this question by presenting infants and adults with videos of a block-
stacking action that was either performed by one agent or two agents, and compared 
their gaze behaviour towards action goals. The overarching goal was identical in both 
conditions (‘to build a tower’); only the sub-goals (‘to grasp a block’, ‘to stack it’) 
differed, in that they were performed by one or two agents. The tested infants were 9 
and 12 months old, and had little or no experience with coordinated joint action 
themselves, whereas adults usually are very experienced in coordinating their actions 
with others. It was found that infants differed in their perception of individual and 
joint action, in that they anticipated individual action faster, whereas adults could 
anticipate both actions equally well. Infants possibly represented the sub-goals of the 
block-stacking action in isolation, which led to delayed gaze shifts in the joint 
condition, when they had to switch between the representations of the two agents’ 
sub-goals. Adults, however, were able to infer the overarching joint goal of two 
agents, which led to comparable gaze behaviour in both conditions. These findings 
suggest a modulating influence of experience on the perception of joint action. 
Study 3: Conversation perception by prelinguistic and linguistic children 
The third study investigated how increasing language experience (e.g., semantic 
skills) and the prosodic factor intonation (i.e., the rise and fall of the voice in 
speaking) influence the perception of conversations in prelinguistic and linguistic 
children. For this purpose, children of four age groups (6, 12, 24 and 36 months), and 
adults were presented with videos of two dyadic conversations, one with normal and 
one with flattened, monotone intonation. It was analysed how often participants were 
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able to anticipate a turn (i.e., how often gaze was shifted to the next speaker before 
she started speaking). The first main finding was that only the 3-year-olds and the 
adults were able to reliably anticipate a speaker’s next turn. This indicates that 
extensive language experience is necessary, before semantics are developed 
sufficiently to anticipate the course of a conversation. The second main finding was 
that only 3-year-olds benefited from intonation. Neither in the younger age groups 
nor in adults was the anticipation of turns affected by intonation. This suggests that 
intonation only has a supporting role on conversation perception, when language 
comprehension is well developed but still not as sophisticated as that of adults. Thus, 
language experience alters the proficiency to use this prosodic cue for the perception 
of conversations. 
Conclusions 
This dissertation investigated the influence of increasing experience on action 
perception in three distinctive areas, namely, individual action, joint action and 
conversations. Different levels of cognitive development are necessary to succeed in 
the performance of actions in the respective areas. Likewise, the perception of those 
distinct actions depends on the skills (or experience) that children have gained during 
development. First, experience alters the perception of individual manual action. 
Their understanding involves representing the goals of ‘simple motor actions’ (or 
‘elementary motor acts’, Csibra, 2007). Specifically, experience not only supports 
anticipation of such individual action goals, but also promotes a common 
representation between individual action and perception. Second, experience supports 
the perception of joint action. This involves representing others’ joint goals, in 
addition to the representations of simple motor actions performed by the agents. And 
third, experience supports the perception of conversations. This involves representing 
the semantic and syntactic information of a conversation, as well as using prosodic 
information, such as intonation.  
The findings of the present dissertation thus demonstrate a significant role of 
experience on action perception on different cognitive levels, from simple motor 
actions to complex conversations. Experience plays a special role during 
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development, when new actions and skills are learned constantly. However, it seems 
natural to conclude that experience continues to play a significant role for action 
perception throughout one’s life, which is supported by studies with older and 
younger adults (Cross, Hamilton, & Grafton, 2006; Diersch, Cross, Stadler, Schütz-
Bosbach, & Rieger, 2012). 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Allgemeine Einführung 
Die Ausführung und die Wahrnehmung einer Handlung sind untrennbar miteinander 
verbunden (für einen Überblick, Prinz, Aschersleben, & Koch, 2009). Genauer 
gesagt, teilen beide Bereiche eine gemeinsame Repräsentation (‘common 
representation’, Prinz, 1990, 1997). Daraus resultiert auch, dass die Fähigkeiten, die 
Kinder während ihrer Entwicklung erlernen, ihre Wahrnehmung von Handlungen 
anderer Personen beeinflussen (z.B. Cannon, Woodward, Gredebäck, von Hofsten, & 
Turek, 2012; Kanakogi & Itakura, 2011). Im Allgemeinen können Handlungen von 
einer einzelnen Person ausgeführt werden, wie zum Beispiel das Greifen nach einer 
Tasse Kaffee (‘nonverbale individuelle Handlung’). Sie können aber auch von 
mehreren Personen gemeinsam ausgeführt werden, so wie das gemeinsame 
Vorbereiten des Abendessens (‘nonverbale gemeinsame Handlung’, im Englischen 
bekannt als ‘Joint Action’) oder ein dyadisches Gespräch (‘verbale gemeinsame 
Handlung’). Um solche nonverbalen und verbalen, individuellen und gemeinsamen 
Handlungen erfolgreich auszuführen,  müssen Kinder verschiedene Fähigkeiten 
erlernen: Säuglinge lernen im ersten Lebensjahr verschiedene manuelle Handlungen 
auszuführen (z.B. Bourgeois, Khawar, Neal, & Lockman, 2005). Im zweiten 
Lebensjahr lernen Kinder, solche individuellen Handlungen mit anderen Personen zu 
gemeinsamen Handlungen zu koordinieren (Brownell, 2011). Im dritten Lebensjahr 
meistern Kinder die verbale Interaktion mit Anderen (Clark, 2003). Die Handlungen 
in den verschiedenen Bereichen erfordern daher neue Fähigkeiten, die Kinder 
allmählich während der ersten drei Lebensjahre lernen. 
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Die vorliegende Dissertation hatte zum Ziel, den Einfluss der zunehmenden 
Erfahrung in der Ausführung von nonverbalen und verbalen, individuellen und 
gemeinsamen Handlungen auf die Handlungswahrnehmung (bzw. das 
Handlungsverständnis) zu untersuchen. Dazu wurden Teilnehmern verschiedenen 
Alters Handlungen visuell präsentiert und ihr Blickverhalten gemessen. Die Art, wie 
Versuchsteilnehmer ihren Blick auf ein Handlungsziel (nonverbale Handlungen) oder 
zwischen zwei Gesprächspartnern (verbale Handlung) verschieben, kann darüber 
Aufschluss geben, ob sie die Handlungsziele, bzw. den Gesprächsverlauf, antizipieren 
können. Das Auftreten von antizipatorischem Blickverhalten indiziert, dass ein 
Beobachter eine Repräsentation des Handlungsziels aufgebaut hat, die es ihm 
ermöglicht, den Ausgang einer Handlung vorherzusagen, bevor sie vollständig 
ausgeführt wurde. Säuglinge können zum Beispiel die Ziele von vielen manuellen 
Handlungen im Alter von 12 Monaten antizipieren (z.B. Cannon, et al., 2012; Falck-
Ytter, Gredebäck, & von Hofsten, 2006). Diese Fähigkeit wird typischerweise von 
der eigenen Erfahrung der Kinder moduliert (z.B. Gredebäck & Melinder, 2010). 
Zusammenfassung der Dissertation 
Diese Dissertation beinhaltet drei Studien, in welchen die Wahrnehmung einer 
individuellen manuellen Handlung (Studie 1), als auch die einer gemeinsamen 
manuellen Handlung (Studie 2), und die eines visuell präsentierten Gesprächs (Studie 
3) untersucht werden. In jeder Studie wurden verschiedene Altersgruppen getestet, 
um den Einfluss der zunehmenden Erfahrung auf die Antizipation von 
Handlungszielen zu untersuchen. 
Studie 1: Die gemeinsame Repräsentation von individuellen Handlungen 
In der ersten Studie wurde untersucht, ob ein Zusammenhang zwischen der 
Wahrnehmung und der Ausführung einer individuellen Handlung (d.h. eine 
gemeinsame Repräsentation) gebildet wird, sobald eine Handlung während der 
Entwicklung erlernt wird, oder ob mehr aktive Handlungserfahrung dafür nötig ist. 
Dazu wurden sechs- und zwölfmonatigen Säuglingen Videos von kontralateralen 
Handlungen präsentiert (z.B. Greifen  quer über die Körpermittellinie) und ihre 
Blickbewegungen zu Handlungszielen gemessen. Zusätzlich wurde die Fähigkeit von 
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Säuglingen selbst kontralateral zu greifen mit einem Paradigma gemessen, das von 
Bruner (1969) entwickelt wurde. Kontralaterales Greifen entsteht in der Mitte des 
ersten Lebensjahres und entwickelt sich über die nächsten Monate langsam weiter. 
Daher ist dies ein besonders geeignetes Paradigma, um die Entstehung eines 
Zusammenhangs zwischen Handlungswahrnehmung und –ausführung zu 
untersuchen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Zwölfmonatige wie erwartet öfter 
kontralaterale Handlungen ausführten als Sechsmonatige. Ausserdem konnten die 
Zwölfmonatigen die Handlungsziele antizipieren, während die Sechsmonatigen 
reaktive Blickbewegungen zeigten (d.h. ihr Blick erreichte das Ziel erst nachdem die 
Handlung bereits beendet war). Das wichtigste Ergebnis war jedoch, dass eine 
Korrelation zwischen beiden Aufgaben erst bei Zwölfmonatigen nachzuweisen war, 
jedoch noch nicht bei Sechsmonatigen. Diese Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass eine 
gemeinsame Repräsentation zwischen Handlungswahrnehmung und –ausführung 
nicht unmittelbar gebildet wird. Stattdessen ist für die Herausbildung eines solchen 
Zusammenhangs ein gewisses Ausmaß an aktiver Erfahrung oder ‘Training’ mit der 
Handlung notwendig. 
Studie 2: Der Unterschied zwischen individueller und gemeinsamer Handlung 
Die zweite Studie betraf die Wahrnehmung von gemeinsamen Handlungen. Kinder 
erlernen während des zweiten Lebensjahres, ihre Handlungen gemeinsam mit anderen 
zu koordinieren (Brownell, 2011). Sie können jedoch von Anfang an gemeinsame 
Handlungen beobachten. Es ist noch unerforscht, ob die Wahrnehmung von 
gemeinsamen Handlungen sich essenziell von individuellen Handlungen 
unterscheidet, oder ob sie den gleichen Entwicklungsverlauf nimmt. Wir haben diese 
Frage adressiert, indem wir Säuglingen und Erwachsenen eine Turmbauhandlung 
präsentiert haben, die entweder von einer oder zwei Personen ausgeführt wurden. Das 
Blickverhalten der Versuchsteilnehmer zu den beobachteten Handlungszielen konnte 
dann zwischen beiden Bedingungen verglichen werden. Das übergeordnete Ziel 
dieser Handlungen war in beiden Bedingungen gleich (‘einen Turm bauen’), die 
Unterziele (‘einen Stein greifen’, ‘ihn auf den Turm legen’) unterschieden sich jedoch 
darin, dass sie von ein oder zwei Personen ausgeführt wurden. Die getesteten 
Säuglinge waren neun und zwölf Monate alt und verfügten über wenig bzw. gar keine 
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eigene Erfahrung mit koordinierten gemeinsamen Handlungen. Erwachsenen sind 
dagegen normalerweise sehr erfahren darin, ihre Handlungen mit anderen zu 
koordinieren. Es konnte gezeigt werden, dass Säuglinge individuelle und gemeinsame 
Handlungen unterschiedlich wahrnahmen. Sie antizipierten Handlungsziele der 
individuellen Handlung schneller als die der gemeinsamen. Die Erwachsenen konnten 
beide Handlungsziele gleich gut antizipieren. Säuglinge haben möglicherweise die 
Unterziele der Turmbauhandlung isoliert repräsentiert, was zu verzögerten 
Blickbewegungen geführt hat, wenn zwischen den Repräsentationen der 
Handlungsziele zweier Personen gewechselt werden musste. Die Erwachsenen waren 
dagegen dazu in der Lage, das übergeordnete Ziel beider Handlungen zu inferieren, 
was zu einem ähnlichen Blickverhalten in beiden Bedingungen geführt hat. Diese 
Ergebnisse deuten auf einen modulierenden Einfluss von Erfahrung auf die 
Wahrnehmung von gemeinsamen Handlungen. 
Studie 3: Gesprächswahrnehmung durch vorsprachliche und sprechende Kinder 
In der dritten Studie wurde untersucht wie sich die zunehmende Spracherfahrung 
(z.B. semantische Fähigkeiten) und der prosodische Aspekt der Intonation (d.h. die 
Sprachmelodie) auf die Wahrnehmung von Gesprächen durch vorsprachliche und 
sprechende Kinder auswirken. Zu diesem Zweck wurden Kindern aus vier 
Altersgruppen (6, 12, 24 und 36 Monate) und Erwachsenen Videos von zwei 
dyadischen Gesprächen präsentiert, eines mit normaler Intonation und eines mit 
abgeflachter, monotoner Intonation. Es wurde ausgewertet, wie oft die 
Versuchsteilnehmer einen Sprecherwechsel antizipieren konnten (d.h. wie oft der 
Blick zur nächsten Sprecherin wechselte, bevor diese angefangen hatte zu sprechen). 
Der erste Hauptbefund war, dass nur die Dreijährigen und die Erwachsenen einen 
Sprecherwechsel zuverlässig vorhersagen konnten. Dies deutet darauf hin, dass 
umfassende Spracherfahrung notwendig ist, damit das Sprachverständnis weit genug 
entwickelt ist, um den Verlauf eines Gespräches zu antizipieren. Der zweite 
Hauptbefund war, dass nur die Dreijährigen vom Vorhandensein normaler Intonation 
profitierten. Weder die jüngeren Altersgruppen noch die Erwachsenen waren bei ihrer 
Antizipation der Sprecherwechsel von Intonation beeinflusst. Dies deutet auf eine 
unterstützende Rolle der Intonation für die Gesprächswahrnehmung, wenn das 
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Sprachverständnis schon weit entwickelt, jedoch noch nicht so fortgeschritten ist, wie 
das von Erwachsenen. Spracherfahrung wirkt sich somit auf die Fähigkeit aus, den 
prosodischen Aspekt der Intonation für die Antizipation eines Gesprächsverlaufs zu 
nutzen. 
Schlussfolgerungen 
In dieser Dissertation wurde untersucht, welchen Einfluss die zunehmende 
Handlungserfahrung auf die Wahrnehmung von Handlungen in drei unterschiedlichen 
Bereichen hat, nämlich individuelle Handlungen, gemeinsame Handlungen und 
Gespräche. Es sind verschiedene kognitive Entwicklungsstufen notwendig, um 
Handlungen in den Bereichen erfolgreich auszuführen. Aber auch die Wahrnehmung 
dieser unterschiedlichen Handlungen hängt von den Erfahrungen und Fähigkeiten ab, 
die Kinder während ihrer Entwicklung gewinnen. Erstens, Erfahrung ändert das 
Verständnis von individuellen, manuellen Handlungen. Dies beinhaltet die 
Repräsentation von ‘einfachen motorischen Handlungen’ (oder ‘elementary motor 
acts’, Csibra, 2007). Erfahrung unterstützt nicht nur die Antizipation von solchen 
einfachen Handlungszielen, sondern fördert auch eine gemeinsame Repräsentation 
von Handlungswahrnehmung und –ausführung. Zweitens, Erfahrung fördert das 
Verständnis von gemeinsamen Handlungen. Zusätzlich zur Repräsentation von 
einfachen Handlungszielen erfordert dies auch die Repräsentation von gemeinsamen 
Handlungszielen. Drittens, Erfahrung unterstützt das Verständnis von Gesprächen. 
Dies beinhaltet die Repräsentation von semantischen und syntaktischen 
Informationen des Gesprächs, als auch die Nutzung von prosodischer Information wie 
Intonation. 
Die Befunde der vorliegenden Dissertationen zeigen demzufolge einen bedeutenden 
Einfluss von Erfahrung auf die Wahrnehmung und das Verständnis von Handlungen 
auf verschiedenen kognitiven Ebenen, von einfachen motorischen Handlungen bis hin 
zu komplexen Gesprächen. Erfahrung spielt demnach eine besondere Rolle während 
der Entwicklung, wenn fortwährend neue Handlungen und Fähigkeiten erlernt 
werden. Es scheint jedoch naheliegend, dass Erfahrung auch im weiteren 
Lebensverlauf eine bedeutende Rolle für die Handlungswahrnehmung spielt. Dies 
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wird von Studien bestätigt, die junge und ältere Erwachsene untersuchten (Cross, 
Hamilton, & Grafton, 2006; Diersch, Cross, Stadler, Schütz-Bosbach, & Rieger, 
2012). 
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